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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, an important change occurred in a small Latin American country: for the first time, a 
leftwing party, the Frente Amplio, was ruling at the head of Uruguay. At first glance, this may 
not look like a crucial event. However, in few years only, this political direction Uruguay took 
conducted it at the front of worldwide newspapers. On several sensitive issues such as the 
Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy - VIP, the homosexual marriage and the use of cannabis, 
Uruguay adopted a progressive vision and disrupted the status quo in force in Latin America. 
Those laws passed by Uruguay created the controversy and all eyes were fixed on this small 
country to see what was occurring. The charismatic and atypical President José Pepe Mujica’s 
speeches and declarations fomented this increased attention for Uruguay. A few years went by 
since Uruguay was at the front page of many newspapers. Here comes the moment for 
Uruguay to appreciate and to evaluate the repercussions of this period. 
This change of political orientation in 2005 in Uruguay happened during a period of changes 
within Latin America. The region went through different dynamic changes recently: the 
seventies suffered from the ruling of dictatorship and repression, the eighties were the period 
of democratization and optimism for the future and finally, the nineties were marked by the 
Washington Consensus logic, supporting neo-liberalism and open regionalism, a strategy 
“strengthening unity among members while increasing interaction with non-members”1. 
However, the beginning of the new millennium has been synonym of troubles in the process 
of democratization and neo-liberalism. The decreased support to open regionalism and the 
deception of neo-liberalism reforms made room for the apparition of the “left turn” of the 
region: leftist or center-leftist governments started to rule, as in Uruguay and the Frente 
Amplio. This new dynamic within Latin America is still taking place nowadays and is under 
evolution. Nevertheless, some accounts already qualified it as a period of post-hegemonic 
regionalism
2
, highlighting the loss of hegemony of the United States and the absence of any 
hegemonic model, but rather a coexistence and an overlapping of a plurality of models. Our 
                                                 
1
 Takashi Terada, “The Origins of Japan’s APEC Policy: Foreign Minister Takeo Miki’s Asia: Pacific Policy and 
Current Implications,” The Pacific Review 11, no. 3 (January 1998): 353, doi:10.1080/09512749808719261. 
2
 Among others, Diana Tussie and Pablo Trucco, Nación Y Región En América Del Sur. Los Actores Nacionales 
Y La Economía Política de La Integración Sudamericana (Buenos Aires: Teseo, 2010); Amitav Acharya, 
“Regional Worlds in a Post-Hegemonic Era,” Working Paper N°1 (Cahiers de SPIRIT/SPIRIT, 2009), 
http://amitavacharyaacademic.blogspot.com/2008/10/regional-worlds-in-post-hegemonic-era.html; José Briceño-
Ruiz and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, “Post-Hegemonic Regionalism, UNASUR, and the Reconfiguration of 
Regional Cooperation in South America,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 40, no. 1 
(2015): 48–62. 
 General introduction  
2 
 
work studies the development of Uruguay within this context of evolution and radical changes 
within the Latin American regionalization. 
On another side, the International Relations - IR literature is increasingly focusing on the 
study of the specific behavior of Small States and, in particular, on their relations to norms. 
The world’s legally sovereign states are mostly Small States with restricted resources. In the 
international system, they are confronted to large states with powerful capabilities. Recent 
accounts have been devoted to the study of how international norms bound large states’ 
actions and reversely, how Small States overcome the limitation of their resources thanks to 
normative power. Powerful states may feel restricted by international norms to fully use their 
capabilities. On the contrary, Small States may use international norms as a lever to make 
their voice louder. The formation and role of norms are complex concepts that Constructivists 
try to develop to further understand how they influence the world structure. 
Observing that Uruguay, a Small State in Latin America, took recently a strong progressive 
stance on different polemical matters, it is pertinent to wonder how it impacted its regional 
status, in a context of changes of regional dynamics. The country is repeatedly confronted to 
handle discussions and negotiations with powerful states such as Brazil and Argentina. The 
capacity for Uruguay to make its interests respected is thus questionable. Besides, the context 
of global globalization gradually eliminating barriers to trade further puts into question the 
possibility for Uruguay to assert its foreign policy. Given the recent vanguard position of 
Uruguay and the influence that a Small State can achieve thanks to a norm advocacy 
approach, our research question is “to which extent Uruguay can be considered as a norm 
entrepreneur in Latin America?”. Our research is devoted to the norm advocacy strategy and 
its ability to increase Small States’ influence through, the case study of Uruguay and its three 
polemical laws on abortion, same-sex marriage and cannabis. Therefore, the object of this 
research is the relevance of the three recent social pioneering laws of Uruguay in the 
construction process of the country’s regional influence and role. To answer our research 
question, we evaluate the impact of the three Uruguay’s pioneering laws on the Latin 
American discourse. 
The case study of Uruguay and its polemical laws allows us to fill the gaps of the literature on 
two main aspects. First, the literature still needs to further develop the relations existing 
between Small States and norms. Ideas and norms form a new point of interest of the current 
general IR theory. Yet, the Small States study has just started to give it more attention. 
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Indeed, it developed the concept of Small States’ normative power. However, those premises 
of normative power and norm advocacy strategy have been mainly applied to case studies 
within the European Union - EU. They have not been tested enough to be considered as solid 
concepts. Through the study of Uruguay’s normative power, we aim to fill this gap and to 
increase further the solidity of the hypothesis claiming that, Small States can gain more 
influence thanks to the norm advocacy approach. Second, much attention have been dedicated 
to the Southern Common Market - MERCOSUR, the Union of South American Nations - 
UNASUR, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States - CELAC and, the 
position of Uruguay within those organizations. Nevertheless, the regional role of Uruguay 
happens not only through its position within those organizations. Part of the regional image of 
Uruguay is therefore missing in the existing literature. And in particular, the recent pioneering 
laws adopted in Uruguay have not been much studied up to now, even if many newspapers 
have spoken about them. We thus fill this gap by observing the impact of them on Uruguay’s 
regional image and role. 
The method used in this research consists mainly in a textual analysis. Thanks to academic 
accounts, we first establish the general context and the status of the Latin American discourse 
regarding abortion, same-sex marriage and cannabis, prior to the three polemical laws of 
Uruguay. Second, we dress up an image of the vision and arguments Uruguay used to support 
the legalization of the three issues. This part is done thanks to the analysis of academic 
literature, of declarations of political leaders to local newspapers and information given by 
state websites. Third, we review local newspapers as well as websites of state and non-state 
organizations to evaluate how those laws have been accepted by the countries of the region. 
Statements and speeches of political leaders of the region are analyzed in order to gauge the 
size of the impact of the laws passed by Uruguay. This is mainly for this part that we use 
textual analysis. Finally, as a result of this analysis, we compare our outcome with the 
literature existing regarding norm entrepreneurship and norm advocacy approach in the case 
of Small States. We put our results in the literature perspective in order to answer our research 
question and to determine if Uruguay is a norm entrepreneur in Latin America.  
The work is structured as followed: after this general introduction establishing the guideline 
of our study, the second part presents an overview of the sources used in this work. The third 
part is devoted to the review of literature related to our topic; the concept of Small States 
study, of Small States normative power and the Uruguay regional integration are successively 
developed. The fourth part consists in the main body of our study: we test the norm advocacy 
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approach in the case of Uruguay by reviewing its regional influence through its laws on VIP, 
same-sex marriage and cannabis. We proceed following the chronology of the laws: we start 
with the abortion issue, follow with the same-sex marriage issue and end with the cannabis 
issue. The fourth part ends with the summary of the results that we can take out of this 
analysis and their consequences on the regional role of Uruguay. We finish the thesis with a 
fifth part gathering the main conclusions of our work. 
 Review of sources  
5 
 
II. REVIEW OF SOURCES 
Our research is based on the analysis of different groups of primary sources: academic 
literature, official documents, mass media sources, reports and working papers produced by 
state and non-state organizations. In this part, we present each of them and their contribution 
to our research. Then, we also highlight the problems that we faced conducting our study 
regarding the primary sources we had to our disposal. 
First, we used the academic literature to establish the portrait of the current Latin American 
discourse and its evolution regarding the different topics we study, namely abortion, same-sex 
marriage and cannabis. Those three topics are current hot issues for the region. Therefore, 
many accounts, mostly from Latin America, have been dedicated to the explanation of the 
Latin American opinion related to the VIP, the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender - 
LGBT community’s rights and, the drug control policies. Those accounts, papers and 
monographs, focus on the development and the actual Latin American discourse, highlighting 
its main characteristics and the differences between countries of the region. In this category, 
we can add the information provided by working papers, presentations and reports of 
seminars produced by academicians but not pair-reviewed. We believe this is the more 
accurate tool to observe the status quo in the region prior to Uruguay’s law. 
Second, to complete and illustrate the picture already established by accounts, we used 
numerical data as well as reports produced by non-state organizations, such as think tanks. 
We also used this category to judge how the Latin American discourse evolved after Uruguay 
passed its laws. Within this category, we have used the Americas Quarterly which “is an 
independent publication of Americas Society,” a forum dedicated to education, debate, and 
dialogue in the Americas, “and Council of the Americas,” an international business 
organization, “which for more than 50 years have been dedicated to dialogue in our 
hemisphere”1. We also used the surveys conducted by the Latin American Observatory on 
Drug Policy and Public Opinion from Asuntos del Sur, “an independent thinking, nonprofit 
organization that since 2007, is dedicated to the analysis, discussion and implementation of 
public policy proposals in Latin America”2. The Transnational Institute, “an international 
research and advocacy institute committed to building a just, democratic and sustainable 
                                                 
1
 Americas Quarterly, “About,” accessed April 30, 2016, http://www.americasquarterly.org/about. 
2
 Free translation from Asuntos del Sur, “Misión,” Asuntos Del Sur, accessed April 30, 2016, 
http://www.asuntosdelsur.org/mision/. 
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planet”1 was also helpful in providing details on the insights of Latin America related to our 
three topics. More specifically regarding the Latin American discourse on abortion and its 
evolution, we used the information given by the Guttmacher Institute, “a leading research 
and policy organization committed to advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights in 
the United States and globally”2 and, the Center for Reproductive Rights, “a global 
reproductive rights organization” using “the law to advance reproductive freedom as a 
fundamental human right”3. About LGBT’s right and same-sex marriage, the International 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, “the world federation of national 
and local organizations dedicated to achieving equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans 
and intersex people”4, appeared to be a helpful source of information. Finally, the InSight 
Crime foundation, which is dedicated to the study of the threat of organized crime in Latin 
America and Caribbean
5
, has been useful for the study of the drug control regime evolution. 
Third, the United Nations - UN appeared to be helpful in providing necessary information and 
also, in showing the evolution of the Latin American discourse. In particular, we used 
information provided by the following programmes: the UN Population Fund, the UN 
Development Programme and, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Another 
intergovernmental organization, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean - ECLAC, one of the five regional commissions of the United Nations, was a 
particularly useful primary source since it is a crucial actor of the debate on abortion. 
Regarding the cannabis regulation, this was also the case of the International Narcotics 
Control Board - INCB, the “independent, quasi-judicial expert body responsible of the 
implementation of the United Nations drug conventions”6.  
Fourth, we used official documents, and in particular the text of the three polemical laws of 
Uruguay, when we established Uruguay’s vision on the three matters studied. It was important 
to understand completely the point of view of Uruguay on the issues treated to be able to 
distinguish its repercussion in the region. We believe the laws are the most appropriate tools 
                                                 
1
 Transnational Institute, “Overview of Drug Policies, Drug Law and Legislative Trends in Mexico,” 
Transnational Institute, accessed March 1, 2016, http://druglawreform.info/en/country-
information/mexico/item/205-mexico. 
2
 Guttmacher Institute, “About,” Guttmacher Institute, November 20, 2015, https://www.guttmacher.org/about. 
3
 Center for Reproductive Rights, “About Us,” Center for Reproductive Rights, January 25, 2011, 
http://www.protectabortionaccess.org. 
4
 International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, “About Us,” International Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, accessed April 30, 2016, http://ilga.org/about-us/. 
5
 InSight Crime, “About Us,” accessed April 30, 2016, http://www.insightcrime.org/about-us. 
6
 International Narcotics Control Board, “The International Narcotics Control Board,” The International 
Narcotics Control Board, accessed April 13, 2016, https://www.incb.org/incb/en/about.html. 
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to understand the objective behind them. We further completed the information thanks to 
documents available on the websites of different Uruguayan ministries and the news provided 
by the website of the Presidency of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay. Within this category, 
we can also add that we used the information given the Junta Nacional de Drogas, “an 
interdepartmental agency dependant of the Presidency of the Republic, responsible of 
defining the political lines in different areas regarding demand reduction, supply control and 
money laundering, studies, information and research systematization, treatment and 
rehabilitation, communication, public and academic debate”1.  
Fifth, to evaluate what was the reaction of Latin American political leaders following 
Uruguay’s polemical laws, we used electronic, mainly local, newspapers. Declarations and 
reactions from political leaders of the region have been spotted, among others, in the 
following newspapers: Clarin, La Nación, Infobae for Argentina; El Espectador for 
Colombia; El Universo for Ecuador; ABC Color for Paraguay. We also used newspapers from 
outside the region that were dealing with the topics and giving pertinent information. Those 
newspapers are, among others, the Agencia EFE, the BBC News and its corollary for Latin 
America, BBC Mundo, the Huffington Post, the New York Times, the Economist and, El 
País. Regarding Uruguay, it was crucial for us to look for the declarations of national political 
leaders to understand better the point of view of the country. For that purpose, we used the 
Uruguayan version of El País, namely elpais.com.uy, the Diario La República, the 
Montevideo Portal, the Portal 180, the UyPress, la Diaria and, El Observador. Overall, we 
tried to diversify the newspapers to get a nuanced image of the phenomenon studied.  
Sixth and ultimately, we used the websites of the different main regional organizations such 
as the OAS, the MERCOSUR, the UNASUR or the CELAC, to observe if Uruguay’s view on 
the different topics addressed impacted the vision of those organizations. Those websites were 
also a tool to dress up the opinion of those significant organizations about the issues analyzed 
in our research. Given the importance of the organizations for Uruguay and in general, for 
Latin America, it is crucial for our research to examine their point of view. Indeed, regional 
organizations can work as a platform for spreading a norm or an idea in larger scales or, can 
be a place for debating norms among countries. We also used charters of those organizations 
                                                 
1
 Free translation from Junta Nacional de Drogas, “Cometido de La JND,” Junta Nacional de Drogas, accessed 
April 11, 2016, 
http://www.infodrogas.gub.uy/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&layout=info&id=2&Itemid=5. 
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as well as their adopted resolutions to understand better their purpose and the orientation of 
their point of view. 
After this description of the literature and primary sources we used in our research, let us give 
their advantages as well as their disadvantages. First of all, we believe that, in comparison 
with other main regions of the world, the study of Latin America present a major linguistic 
advantage. Primary sources are generally in Spanish or Portuguese and this eases undeniably 
their analysis. The language barrier is easily crossed if you have knowledge in those 
languages, what is not the case for other regions of the world where the language barrier is 
much more substantial. 
Second, the three topics we studied in our research are currently in debate in the region. 
Therefore, the topics are abundantly treated by local newspapers and by state and non-state 
organizations or institutes. Much attention is given to their evolution. This allowed us to work 
with a large panel of diversified primary sources and literature. We believe that the 
diversification of sources increases the solidity of our research in the sense that it helped us to 
produce nuanced results. A piece of information can be easily completed or illustrated by 
numerical data since we can cross sources of information. On the other hand, the abundance 
of sources also increases the risk to miss crucial information. It is easier to fail to notice 
specific pertinent information when looking through a large panel of diversified sources. We 
had to pick information from there and there, meaning that we may have gone along less 
exposed important facts. To diminish this risk of missing information, the whole work 
required a deep and diversified investigation. 
Third, the actuality of the issues studied made it hard to be fully updated. During the whole 
process of our research, some countries of Latin America were adopting new laws and 
positions regarding the three topics studied. Organizations and institutes producing reports 
have been also releasing new crucial surveys or opinions during the development of this work. 
On the one side, it helped us to have abundant and updated sources of information. This 
increases the solidity of our research. On the other side, this quick evolution of the topics 
studied made it harder to present the day to day reality present in Latin America. We 
attempted to be as close as possible to the actual situation in Latin America but, given this 
rapid evolution of those hot issues, we may have missed a recent fact relevant for our study. 
Finally, Uruguay passed recently its three polemical laws. The country is still experimenting 
its alternative approaches and assessing the effects of those laws. Few years only passed since 
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Uruguay adopted the three polemical laws. The country already released some studies 
evaluating the consequences and results obtained following the laws. However, it may be too 
soon for the country to decide whether to stick to the same path or to adapt the vision 
implemented. For the three topics, mainly for the issues of abortions and of the cannabis 
regulation, there is a necessity for Uruguay to establish whether it has been able to reach the 
objective of enhancing citizens’ security, rights and health. Without this evaluation, the 
position adopted by Uruguay may have a lesser impact in the region since there is less facts to 
illustrate their benefits. Therefore, if Uruguay were able to demonstrate the long-term benefits 
of its laws, their impact would easier to spot and gauge. We consider thus that, in a close 
future, new primary sources may be added to the one we used and may further enhance the 
solidity of our work. 
Now that we have defined the sources of information used for our research, their pro and 
cons, let us move to the review of literature related to our topic. This part is divided into three 
sections related to our research question: the Small States study, the norm advocacy strategy 
and the Uruguay’s regional integration. 
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III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Our review of literature focuses on three topics related to our research question: the Small 
States study, the norm advocacy strategy and the Uruguay’s regional integration.  
Regarding the Small States study, we first retrace its brief history and then, we go deeper in 
two important sub-topics: the concept of smallness and the specificities of Small States’ 
foreign policy established by scholars. This first section overall shows that Small States study, 
as a recent area of research, suffers from a lack of a well established and documented 
literature. As Björkdahl
1
 suggested recently, Small States study suffers from two important 
pitfalls: first, the arguments used by the literature to disclaim the idea that Small States are 
subjected to big states’ willingness are generally of little evidence; second, Small States 
research focuses too much on issues related to past IR theory, such as the matter of 
international peace and of security. Our objective is then to overcome those drawbacks by 
presenting a research in line with the new tendencies of IR theories, i.e. the focus on the 
importance of ideas and norms in international relations. Our work will therefore help the 
Small States study to stay in line with the trends of the global IR theory and consequently, to 
be considered as worthy of attention.  
The second section is dedicated to the norm advocacy strategy, a diplomatic strategy that may 
be used by Small States with normative power to improve their relatively limited influence on 
the international affairs. This concept, as we describe further, has recently appeared in the 
literature of Small States and up to now, has mainly focused on Scandinavian states within the 
EU. In order to be recognized as solid, it is clear thus that this concept has to be studied 
deeper and, to be applied to other regions of the world. Moreover, the EU model generally 
offers a reality too specific and too unique to test efficiently the validity of an idea. If scholars 
want to test a hypothesis, it is important to test it through different situations and not only 
within the EU. By assessing the validity of the norm advocacy strategy with the case of 
Uruguay, we try to improve the solidity of this concept. Yet, it can happen that we conclude 
that the concept does not fit the case of Uruguay and consequently, the case of Small States 
outside of the EU. This conclusion will also help the concept to become more accurate. 
Indeed, in that case, we will know that the strategy of norm advocacy better fits the case of 
European countries, instead of being applicable all over the world. Overall, the notion of norm 
                                                 
1
 Annika Björkdahl, “Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy,” Swiss Political Science Review 19, no. 3 
(September 2013): 323, doi:10.1111/spsr.12046. 
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advocacy strategy is suffering from its newness and needs further evidence to become well 
established in the literature. Through our study, we hope to help to overcome this gap. 
Finally, we finish the review of literature by discussing the recent history of the Uruguayan 
foreign policy. It appears that recent accounts have mainly focused on the MERCOSUR, the 
UNASUR, the CELAC and, the place of Uruguay within those organizations. Few studies 
have been dedicated to other topics related to Uruguayan foreign policy and in particular, little 
attention has been devoted to the recent pioneering laws voted in Uruguay: the 
decriminalization of the VIP, the egalitarian marriage and the state cannabis regulation. We 
believe in the importance of assessing the significance of those laws for the image and for the 
foreign policy of Uruguay. In the past few years, newspapers such as The New York Times, 
The Guardian, Le Monde, El País, Il Corriere della Sera, Le Soir and so on, have dedicated 
many articles about the pioneering social role of Uruguay
1
. We consider that this movement 
has to be analyzed and that it may have an impact on Uruguay’s role in the region. By using 
another research perspective about the foreign policy of Uruguay, we hope to complete the 
already existing image of the country. We expect also to open new ways for the analysis of 
other similar countries. 
In general, our study attempts to keep Small States study updated and in link with general IR 
theory, to test the solidity of the concept of norm advocacy strategy and finally, to complete 
the image of Uruguay by interpreting the impact of its recent pioneering laws.  
III.A. SMALL STATES STUDY  
The review of the development of Small States studies that Neumann and Gstöhlkt
2
 present in 
their work help us to cover the recent history of this branch, occupying a niche position in the 
IR field. 
Before the mid-nineteenth century, Small States studies received barely any attention from 
scholars. Even if the visibility of Small States in new international organizations increased 
after 1945, the popularity of this topic remained rather limited, all eyes focusing on the 
bipolarity of the Cold War. "In retrospect it seems surprising that in spite of the growing 
                                                 
1
 Sebastián Aguiar and Felipe Arocena, “Menant La Marche: l’Uruguay et Ses Trois Lois Avant-Gardistes,” 
Cahiers Des Amériques Latines 2014, no. 77 (2014): 69. 
2
 I. Neumann and S. Gstöhlkt, “Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World? Small States in International Relations,” 
Working Paper (University of Iceland: Centre for Small State Studies, 2004). 
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number of small states only a small number of sociological studies were devoted to this 
subject in the first two decades after World War II"
1
.  
A genuine school of Small States studies began in the 1960’s with Fox’s2 study of the 
wartime diplomacy of Small States. Fox, as a pioneer of this branch, helped the Small States 
study to receive more interests from scholars in the aftermath of the World War II. In this 
context of Cold War, scientific attention
3
 was mainly focused on the survival of weaker states 
induced by their incapability to guarantee their own security. Three reasons, identified by 
Höll
4
, explain this amplified attention:  
1. “the "bias" towards great powers and the U.S., with American research increasingly 
perceived as making for a deficit of the IR discipline, in particular in the 
Scandinavian scientific community;  
2. the rapid social changes at the end of the 1960s brought traditional political science 
approaches into question;  
3. the increasing international interdependence raised the issue of how states with 
limited capacities coped with the costs of dependence”5. 
The branch of IR studying Small States reached its peak in the 1970’s, during the 
decolonization time and the emergence of new states with limited capacities. They received 
attention both in economics and in political science. Neorealists argued that the international 
behavior of Small States was determined by their physical size or by the comparatively 
limited capabilities. Due to their similar physical constraints, Small States were believed to 
follow a similar foreign policy model which, differed from the one of large states. Researches, 
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 contributed importantly to the Small States 
literature of that time.  
In the late 1970’s, the Small States study suffered however from a lack of interests, except for 
specific problems of European Small States. Previous assumptions about weaker states were 
disclaimed and the concept of Small States was even considered by accounts
4
 as a useless 
analytical tool for the understanding of world affairs. On the other hand, the 1980’s were the 
challenging period for Neorealism, confronted with Neoliberalism. Moving away from an 
exclusive security focus, Neoliberalism brought attention on economic issues, on 
institutionalism and, on the debate between absolute and relative gains. The 1980’s were also 
marked by the apparition of new technologies, making the world little by little more 
globalized. This context of further globalization and regional integration supported the 
reappearance of popularity for Small States study. Nonetheless, scholars of the branch moved 
away from their predecessors’ finding by either not regarding Small States category as 
appropriate for developing IR theories or, by using new methods in their analysis.  
With the end of the Cold War, as Simpson and, Veenendaal and Corbett
5
 explain, the study of 
Small States gained another wave of interests. Indeed, the split of large states, such as the 
Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, fueled this concern. This period is also characterized by a 
relative tolerance between powerful states, allowing weaker states to become independent 
from the cupola of the giants states
6
. Further, issues such as globalization, membership of 
international organizations and regional security have highlighted the important role that 
Small States can play. Finally, the end of the Cold War marked also a change in the IR theory 
with the upcoming of Constructivism and its focus on international norms, identity and ideas. 
The development of Small States study may have been encouraged by this change of 
intellectual thought; the Constructivist School, by emphasizing the role of ideational factors, 
opened space for Small States’ role in world affairs. Consequently, quoting Hey, it can be said 
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that “small states today enjoy more international prestige and visibility than at any other time 
in history”1. And the global trend towards ever smaller states2 will not bring an end to this 
tendency. The Table 1 summarizes the history of Small States study previously exposed. 
Table 1: Synopsis of the Small States studies
3
 
 1950’s-1970’s: heyday 1980’s: standstill 1990’s – today: revival 
Historical 
events 
Cold War conflict, 
proliferation of small 
states through 
decolonization 
decline of the U.S. 
hegemony and rise of 
global interdependence 
end of Cold War, 
globalization and regional 
integration, proliferation 




Realism/Neorealism Neorealism versus 
Neoliberal 
Institutionalism 





definition of small states, 
size and foreign policy, 








small states in European 
integration and in 
globalization 
processes, ethno political 
conflicts 
Over time, the relatively young discipline of Small States study focused on different topics 
that we develop in the following sub-sections: the debate on the definition of the Small States 
category and, the impact of small size on foreign policy and on negotiation power. 
III.A.1. CONCEPT OF SMALLNESS 
A key element in the Small States study is the definition of this category. The academic 
debate about the conceptualization of states size dates back, at least, from the 1950’s4. Yet, 











. As a global remark about this debate, 
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Jazbec notes that “there is general agreement that there is no satisfactory and acceptable 
definition of small states”4. This absence of consensus about the concept of smallness could 
be considered as an obstacle for Small States study. However, to overcome this barrier, the 
literature has established several criteria according to which a state can be considered as 
small. Some accounts
5
 have reviewed the variety of criteria and specifically, Geser argued 
that it exists “three kinds of small state nations: first, substantial smallness refers to the 
"objective", absolute small size of a country's resources such as territory or population (e.g., 
Monaco); second, the relational concept implies relative smallness in comparison to other 
countries (e.g., Belgium-France, France-U.S.); and third, attributive smallness refers to the 
"subjective" small size in the perception of either oneself or others (e.g., Luxembourg)”.6 
III.A.2. PARTICULARITIES OF SMALL STATES FOREIGN POLICY 
The literature recognizes the effect of the size of state on its foreign policy model; Small 
States are not “mini-version” of large states but, do have a proper, specific behavior induced 
by their size limitations. According to Rosenau
7
, size can even be considered as one of the 
three “genotypic variables” that exert a major influence on foreign policy. Besides, East8 also 
declares that empirical studies have proved that the size of a state is an important factor when 
focusing on its international behavior. In the academic field, size is taken into account to 
analyze the behavior of a state on the international scene. 
Therefore, part of the literature focuses on framing the typical foreign policy approach of 
Small States. On that aspect, Vital
9
 observes that the way of using forces differ from small to 
large states: weaker states rather use supranational bodies and alliances, than forces, as a 
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mean to reach their comparatively limited foreign policy objectives. Rothstein
1
 argues that 
Small States fail to engage in planning long term foreign policy strategy because they feel too 
insecure and vulnerable. East’s2 research consists in an analysis of events data what, differs 
from the qualitative approach mainly used in previous studies. Consequently, his conclusion 
varies slightly from the conventional academic belief until then. East suggests that Small 
States engage more in contentious, risky behaviors and employ more nonverbal approaches 
than large states. East justifies this specific behavior by the limitations that Small States face 
in terms of organization capacity and supervision of international affairs. Their constraints 
prevent them from accurate information and capacity to interpret situations at their early 
stage. All in all, those elements form the classical post-war image of Small States, which is 
“unlikely to use force, seeker of alliances, and expert in diplomacy”3. 
Through the existing literature, Small States vulnerability has been a topic largely studied
4
. 
This concept expresses the premise that the survival of weaker states is precarious due to the 
pressure of external constraints over which they have little influence. This Realist perspective 
reflects the words of Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War: “the powerful do 
as they will, and the weak do as they must”5. For Realists, the hierarchy that rules the 
international system puts weaker states at the mercy of stronger ones. Reasons of this 
vulnerability can be found in the economic field (e.g., incapacity to exploit increasing returns 
to scale or, high levels of trade openness), in the security field (e.g., lack of military 





 have criticized this concept of vulnerability arguing that, even if Small 
States have disadvantages when being confronted to larger ones, they have also the capacity 
to constrain or confound the power of the strong. Indeed, as Womack wrote, ‘‘both sides 
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manage their affairs with the confidence that the power of the larger side will not be 
challenged and the autonomy of the smaller side will not be threatened”1. Katzenstein2 also 
analyzed the vulnerability of Small States, focusing on Europe, and observed that their 
military weaknesses allow them to be more flexible and creative in foreign policy issues than 
their larger European counterparts. Aware of their limits, leaders of small countries are more 
willing to develop social partnership, policy learning, cooperation, and flexible adjustments to 
face their challenges. As a consequence, the power of strong states seems limited, even if, 
they can blend the rule of the game to their advantage. As Singer wrote, "power rests as 
much, or more, on the ability to attract as it does on the ability to coerce"
3
. 
Moreover, some accounts have also described this vulnerability as a source of prosperity. This 
was the case of Rothstein
4
 who argued that, this long vulnerable situation forced Small States 
to construct efficient institutions. Thank to this capacity to quickly face challenges, in a 
context of an increasing global political economy, those countries are able to better prosper, 
among others, economically. The institutional advantage of Small States is also used as an 
argument by Campbell and Hall
5
. According to them, if a country is characterized by a 
cultural homogeneity, a cohesive population and a strong national identity, which are easier to 
reach for a small country
6
, the state will be able to coordinate its policy in ways that tend to 
overcome their limitations and, to enhance their long-term socioeconomic performance. 
Empirically, Easterly and Kraay
7
 have demonstrated this superiority in economic performance 
by calculating that Small States, thanks to a productivity advantage, have higher Gross 
Domestic Product - GDP per capita than other states, when controlling for location. To some 
extent, this refutes the belief that Small States suffer from inability to exploit increasing 
returns to scale.  
In the same study, Easterly and Kraay have also estimated that due to their greater openness, 
Small States have greater volatility of annual growth rates. To diversify risk of volatility, the 
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authors recommend Small States to further open up to international capitals even though, they 
admit that benefits of this policy are still not clear in the literature. Katzenstein
1
 also 
advocated a greater openness for Small States, or at least for wealthy European ones, noting 
that, although they are more vulnerable to the global economy, protectionism is not a viable 
option. Small States are likely to suffer from scarce of natural resources, which made them 
dependent on the rest of the world. Furthermore, small size involves small domestic market, 
which leads to a mandatory openness to international trade. Katzenstein exposes thus why 
Small States can be counted among the strongest advocators of international liberalization 
despite the perils of free trade. Through this argument, he actually illustrates the risky 





 have studied the concept of vulnerability in the process of 
negotiation. Indeed, in a negotiation, Small States typically suffer from weaknesses that will 
encourage them to elaborate strategies. They may be weaker in financial or administrative 
terms with the consequence that, they have to narrow the negotiation sessions they attend or, 
they may not have the necessary resources to win others’ positions. The level of expertise 
may also suffer from this lacks of financial or human resources. Indeed, Small States have 
usually smaller or less-well equipped delegations, what makes it harder for them to defend 
their positions in front of bigger states. Also, since they generally fail to behave proactively in 
preparatory sessions, Small States will not tend to be leaders of negotiation sessions, losing in 
that sense the power of formal authority. All capacity-related difficulties might prevent Small 
States from successfully achieving significant goals in international affairs. Those 
administrative, financial and economic limits are slightly softened when international 
negotiations are based on a one-state, one-vote principle, which is often the case. In that 
situation, Small States can even become an important actor and influence the negotiation 
outcomes at their advantage. 
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Moreover, to overcome their difficulties, Small States can apply strategies among which, the 
two main ones are the prioritization or niche diplomacy and, the coalition-building
1
 to join 
forces between likeminded states. When strategies are aimed to influence directly the 
outcome, they are called shaping strategies
2
. When they are aimed to improve the preparation 
of negotiations, they are called capacity-building strategies
3
. The choice between strategies 
depends on two elements: the institutional and the policy-related (whether there is space for 
argumentative strategies) scope. If the environment of negotiations is not highly structured, 
there is space for Small States to bargain and develop shaping strategies. And when it comes 
to policy-related negotiations where expertise and knowledge matter, Small States would 
rather choose a capacity-building strategy. 
This sub-section aimed to portray the behavior of Small States on the international scene by 
reviewing their specificities in foreign policy but also their general vulnerabilities, limits and 
constraints. Even though we have found that the drawbacks involved by smallness might be 
diminished or overcome, Small States are believed above all to “have been largely 
unsuccessful in asserting their own interests in global politics, and that (to the extent that it is 
possible to generalize about states which differ greatly) vulnerabilities rather than 
opportunities are the most striking consequence of smallness in global politics”4. 
III.B. SMALL STATES NORMATIVE POWER 
In the previous sub-section, we have reviewed different strategies that Small States can use to 
achieve influence. Through this review, we observed that the literature tends to claim that 
Small States do not have as many tools as bigger ones to make their voice heard at the 
international level. However, recently, a group of Constructivists
5
 has started to criticize this 
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Realist belief by claiming that Small States, with a certain level of development, have a 
specific advantage on which they can rely: the normative power. Those scholars argue that 
Small States can achieve a prominent role if they use their ideational resources, their 
discursive power resources by relying on notions of legitimacy and moral leadership
1
. An 
example of this moral dimension can be found, as argued by Payne
2
, in the problem of global 
warming for example. Even if they cannot have a significant impact on this issue, Small 
States managed to punch above their weight because their legitimacy has been acknowledged, 
thanks to, to a certain extent, their skills and ardor. 
With the change of IR theory at the end of the Cold War and the upcoming of new theories 
such as Constructivism and its focus on international norms, identity and ideas, we have seen 
that Small States attracted more attention. Indeed, “if not only relative power and/or 
international institutions matter, but also ideational factors, small states may gain new rooms 
of maneuver in their foreign policy”3. Prioritization and coalition-building were therefore not 
anymore the only strategies that Small States possessed to argue with bigger powers; they 
could also use their positive identity or normative power to influence world politics. 
The following sub-sections will go further into this concept of norm advocacy first, by 
reviewing the literature about norms and second, by developing the concept of norm advocacy 




, the concept of norm is generally defined as “a standard for appropriate 
behavior for actors with a given identity”5. Norms establish how a specific actor ought to 
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behave; they establish the practices, the codes of conduct and the standards that a community 
follows. When an actor belongs to a specific community, it is expected to act accordingly to 
the community’s norms. Therefore, those norms influence the identity, the reputation or the 
interests of the actor. In addition, since norms are considered, not only to be regulating 
behaviors, but also, to standardize them, it means that they focus on ways of being, not 
directly on ideas. It also means that norms legitimate behaviors
1
 in a way that, the sense of 
"ought" to behave confers norms a prescriptive quality. As a result, this prescriptive feature 
prevents norms from being bad in the eyes of who promote them.
2
 
It is important to notice that meanwhile scholars speak about norms in political science terms, 
scholars speak about institutions in sociologist terms when they refer to behavioral rules. 
Institutions can be defined as follow: “a relatively stable collection of practices and rules 
defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific institutions”3. It 
appears that norms and institutions are similar concepts but they differ however, in the sense 
that, norms establish single standard ways of being whereas, institutions aggregate, structure 
and interrelate them to form a collection of practices
4
.  
Across the discipline of political science, different categories of norms have been established 
depending on what they focus on. Norms can be regulative, when they order or constrain 
behavior, or constitutive, when they create new actors, new interests, or new categories of 
actions. Another category is sometimes also mentioned in the literature, the prescriptive 
norms, but it has been much less analyzed than the others
5
. Categories can also be defined 
depending on which community they belong to; we can have thus domestic as well as 
international norms. They are interrelated since, most of the time, a norm starts by being a 
domestic one and later, spreads internationally through the effort of entrepreneurs. Moreover, 
when an international norm influences domestic paradigm, it has to adapt to the domestic 
structures and practices already in place. The domestic norms act therefore as a filter for 
international norms and may have an impact on them such that, international norms will be 
interpreted differently domestically. The influence of both categories goes back and forward 
in such a way that, those two levels of norms end by being highly linked. Yet, it seems that 
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domestic norms have a strongest importance at the beginning of the norm’s life cycle, concept 




When a norm starts to be implemented, the actors behind this creation are the norm 
entrepreneurs. They begin the movement towards a new normative context and conceive the 
change of the already existing one. They form the pioneers of the community that will lead 
others towards the desired behavior they believe in. Norm entrepreneurs can also be the ones 
that find solution to particular issues or bring in new suggestions into the discussion
2
. The 
reasons for a norm entrepreneur to undertake this process of norm setting are diverse but the 
most common ones are altruism, ideational commitment, and self-interest
3
. Besides, the 
practices that norm entrepreneurs chose to promote as norms, are not picked randomly but, 
their moral and theoretical attractiveness and their feasibility are taken into account
4
. The 
already existing normative context is another condition for those practices to successfully turn 
into norms. On that subject, some scholars claim that if the norm serves the interests of 
powerful states, it has better chance to spread and to become institutionalized internationally
5
. 
On the contrary, other scholars, such as Björkdahl
6
, see norms as a vehicle for Small States to 
gain more influence. The latter may act as norm entrepreneurs and thus weight on the 
construction of international norms to their vantage. This consists in the norm advocacy 
strategy that we discuss in the following sub-section “III.B.2. Norm advocacy strategy”. 
Each future norm goes true a process before being totally adopted globally. The literature
7
 
calls it “the norm’s life cycle” and this procedure consists in three stages: the norm emergence 
with the persuasion from norm entrepreneurs, the norm cascade involving a broad acceptance 
of the emerging norm from followers and, the norm internalization reached when the norm is 
institutionalized and no longer put into question. When a critical mass of states has adopted 
the norm, it has reached the tipping point and will move from the first stage to the second one. 
The following paragraphs develop those three stages. 
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1. The norm emergence1 
Norm entrepreneurs as well as organizational platforms are responsible of the norm 
creation. As we have explained previously, a norm entrepreneur engages in the 
promotion of norm that fits its values, beliefs and practices. Through the technique of 
norm advocacy, the norm entrepreneur tries to persuade other states to adopt the 
emerging norm. Yet, a norm entrepreneur at the international level needs the support 
of a structure, a platform to launch its norm. This structure will help the norm to 
become institutionalized and more largely accepted. The embracement of this 
emerging norm will also depend on how it fits the existing normative context and on 




This moment, announcing a switch towards the second step, is reached when a 
decisive mass of states has embraced the emerging norm. The necessary decisive 
number for the process to start is hardly predictable since states are not all equal in 
term of normative power. Indeed, it will depend on which states, critical or not, adopt 
the norm. Critical states are the one that have to adopt the norm for it to become 
successfully internationally spread. If those states do not endorse it, its world 
acceptance may be compromised. Some states have also acquired, through their 
history, a certain moral stature and are also considered as critical. The concern of the 
norm determines actually which states are critical. However, in general, the literature 
considers that at least one-third of the total states in the system should have adopted 
the norm for the tipping point to occur. 
2. Norm cascade3 
Now that the tipping point has been reached and that enough (critical) states have 
adopted the emerging norm, the rest of the states will be contaminated. Yet, more than 
a contamination, which is too passive, it is an active process of international 
socialization that will turn the norm breakers into norm followers. In fact, the norm is 
adopted by states in a way that they transformed the identity of their own community. 
Norm breakers that belong to the same community will thus feel peer-pressure to 
adopt the new relevant behavior. The reasons behind this peer-pressure are the need to 
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stay legitimately in the community, to be consistent with the other states or, to keep 
the esteem of the group. This is how international socialization works. 
3. Norm internalization1 
At that stage, the norm is taken-for-granted and fully adopted. This level of 
internalization gives the norm a high level of power because the behavior promoted is 
no longer put into question. In addition, since the norm is totally dissimulated into the 
normative context, no more actors seriously discuss whether adopting it. Table 2 
summarizes the different stage of the norm’s life cycle. 
Table 2: Norm’s life cycle2 
 Stage 1: Norm 
emergence 
Stage 2: Norm cascade Stage 3: 
Internalization 



















Neorealists and Neoliberalists see norms as exogenous. In the search of maximal utility, 
norms can alter actors’ calculations of costs and benefits and can have an impact on decisions 
of policy-makers. Yet, actors do not have influence on norms because of their exogeneity
3
. On 
the contrary, as we have described in the previous discussion, Constructivists believe in the 
influence of actors, norm entrepreneurs and others, on the norms formation. The 
Constructivist School sees norms, identity and interest jointly constructed. Constructivists 
believe that even if national identity is historically rooted, the changing norms continue to 
shape it
4
. A change in a norm will also change the international structure, order and stability; 
since international structure is based on idea and beliefs, a change in norms is the main 
vehicle for a transformation of structure
5
. All in all, endogeneity of norms and norms as a 
vehicle of changes explain why constructivists believe that Small States, through norm 
advocacy, can influence world affairs. For Constructivists, norm entrepreneurship is an 
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efficient diplomatic strategy for Small States to increase their weight in the world decision 
balance
1
. The following sub-section further develops this concept. 
III.B.2. NORM ADVOCACY STRATEGY 
The Constructivist literature
2
 makes the hypothesis that “Small States may gain a constructive 
and effective influence on issues relating to international peace and security by using 
normative power”3. By adopting the norm entrepreneurship as a foreign policy strategy, 
Constructivist scholars believe Small States with normative power are able to initiate 
normative change. Normative power can be defined as “resting on the power of ideas and 
norms, and being related to the concept of ‘civilian’, ‘soft power’, as well as the notion of 
‘ideational power’. It is often associated with actors that have limited traditional power 
resources such as military capabilities”4. Thanks to their influence, i.e., the capacity of a state 
“to make other member states and/or institutions act in a manner they would not otherwise 
have acted”5, Small States can work for the emergence of the norms through the process of 
norm advocacy. The concept of norm advocacy is related to other concepts with moral 
connotations, such as conflict prevention, human rights etc.  
Norm advocacy is considered as a soft strategy, compared to hard ones such as threat
6
. Even 
if the literature on international negotiations does not give a clear answer on which tactics is 
more adapted to which kind of states, it seems to recommend hard strategies for strong actors 
only. According to that hypothesis, weaker states should prefer soft strategies because hard 
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Scandinavian countries form the case study the most analyzed
1
 in that field. Through their 
research, scholars have demonstrated that even if this group of states is militarily weak and 
economically dependent, it managed to act as a norm entrepreneur by providing an alternative 
model of engagement based on cooperation and conflict resolution. Scandinavian countries 
are recognized within the EU, but also globally, as constructors of norms, as social powers. 
Through norm advocacy, they managed to change slightly the international conception of the 
acceptable behavior. This situation is the clearest one in the EU where, Scandinavian states 
convinced the other member states to adopt Scandinavian beliefs by changing and adapting 
institutions or specific policies, mainly in the field of conflict prevention and peaceful conflict 
resolution. 
The norm advocacy strategy may be seen as a non-coercive argumentation of the norm 
entrepreneur that will persuade the rest of the actors that the emerging norm is morally 
appropriate. Small States that choose norm advocacy as a diplomatic strategy have at their 
disposal four ways to reach their objective: framing, agenda-setting, diplomatic tactics and the 
power of the chair. 
As Björkdahl argues, “framing refers to a process of defining reality”2. “Frames provide an 
interpretation of a particular problem, suggest a general line of appropriate action for 
ameliorating that problem, and assign responsibility for carrying out actions to address the 
problem at hand”3. Small States, to successfully promote a norm, should present it in a way 
that fits the already existing normative framework, by using familiar language or commonly 
held values, for example
4
. A well constructed frame will show a link between the emerging 
norm and the general behavioral guideline of the community. 
The idea behind the notion of agenda-setting is to push new ideas at the front. A norm 
entrepreneur should try to bring attention to the new issue and works for keeping it in the 
center of discussions. In that sense, Small States should attempt to influence the shape of the 
discussion agenda of the community.  
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Small States can also use their allies to form a bigger group of likeminded states. For that 
purpose, diplomatic tactics are important in the process of norm advocacy; by setting 
meetings and establishing informal contacts, Small States can observe who can join them in 
the norm defense or, on the contrary, who will be their opponents. The norm entrepreneur 
may use already existing structures and organizations to build greater coalitions. 
Finally, if the community operates with at its head a formal position of president, a norm 
entrepreneur will have more success in promoting the norm when it owns the leading role. In 
some organizations such as the EU, Small States with limited resources can take advantage of 
the formal position of authority to bring forward a norm that fits their beliefs and in which 
they can invest their energies. Indeed, Tallberg
1
 argues that a formal situation of authority will 
grant its owner of a normative power. 
The previous discussion offered an idea of how norm advocacy is perceived in the literature. 
However, it seems the topic has been rather slightly studied and in addition, that it was mainly 
analyzed for countries of the EU. There is a necessity to expand the study of this notion to 
other countries with different characteristics from European ones. 
III.C. URUGUAY REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
In this section, we present the literature analyzing the regional integration of Uruguay by 
focusing on two elements: the foreign policy of the country and its attitude towards three 
regional organizations of which it is member, i.e. the MERCOSUR, the UNASUR and the 
CELAC. The third sub-section pictures historical perspectives about the regional integration 
and role of Uruguay. 
III.C.1. FOREIGN POLICY OF URUGUAY 
This sub-section is divided in two parts: one focusing on the history of the Uruguayan foreign 
policy and, one focusing on the foreign policy that Uruguay has implemented since the year 
2000 up to the present time. This division helps us to go deeper into the current period.  
III.C.1.a. FROM THE INDEPENDENCE UP TO 2000 
To better understand how the country is governed nowadays, let us start by presenting briefly 
the recent history of the Uruguayan foreign policy, thanks to the work of Santander and 
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. Until the 1820’s, the two large neighboring countries, Brazil and Argentina, were 
fighting each other to get the control over the Uruguayan territory. Yet, even if Brazil got 
control over it for a moment, Uruguay took its independence in 1825. The beginnings of 
Uruguay are not trivial in the construction of its triangular foreign policy: split between sea 
and land power and, between Brazil and Argentina. Uruguay belongs to the region called the 
Río de la Plata Basin which is geographically and historically divided between two 
hegemonic poles, Argentina and Brazil, and a frontier zone composed by the three remaining 
smaller countries, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay
2
. Besides, those beginnings also put into 
question the viability of Uruguay not only as a country, but also as a nation, as well as its 
ability to conduct a foreign policy. In fact, at that time, Uruguay was perceived as an 
intermediary entity. As Rothstein described in his research
3
, Uruguay, a Small State whose 
viability was in danger, had to create institutions able to establish internal peace and to resist 
to external pressure. This vulnerability also turned the international insertion into an important 
issue for the country. Thus, when it comes to the insertion of the country, a large variety of 
actors such as the state, the civil society, trade unions, entrepreneurship organizations, student 
or intellectual movements, take part in the debate
4
. From the independence up to the first half 
of the twentieth century, the Uruguayan foreign policy was mainly focusing on its relations 
with Europe. Uruguay, like Argentina, kept a close relationship with England and was an 
important importer of raw materials for European markets. This close economic relation 
helped the political leaders to create internal reforms and to modernize the country. 
After the World War II however, Uruguay no longer benefited from this comfortable 
economic growth. Indeed, the level of their export of raw materials to the European markets 
dropped drastically because Europe was economically exhausted. Uruguay had to change the 
direction of its foreign policy and started to focus on the closer market, that is to say, the 
Argentinean and Brazilian markets. It signed, for example, a Free Trade Agreement - FTA. 
That time was also the moment of the creation of regional and international organizations, 
such as, the ECLAC and the Latin American Free Trade Association. All those institutions 
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enabled Uruguay to better know Latin American countries. The main objective of those 
organizations was to contribute to the expansion of the Latin American markets in order to 




At that time, another regional organization has been established: twenty-one American States, 
including Uruguay, signed in Bogota in 1948 the Charter of the Organization of American 
States – OAS. American countries were already gathering during International Conferences of 
American States since 1889 “for the settlement of disagreements and disputes that may 
hereafter arise between them, and for considering questions relating to the improvement of 
business intercourse […] and to secure more extensive markets for the products of each of 
said countries"
2
. Through the Charter of Bogota, the countries committed themselves in 
developing “an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their 
collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their 
independence"
3
. Today, the OAS gathers thirty-five states of the Americas and gave the status 
of permanent observer to sixty-nine states, and the EU. The activity of the OAS is based on 
the following four main pillars: democracy, human rights, security, and development. In the 
hemisphere, the OAS constitutes the main political, juridical, and social governmental forum. 
In March 2015, Luis Almagro, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, has been 
elected as the OAS General Secretary for the following five years
4
. 
From the 1970’s, the role of Uruguay in the region increased because of the conflictive 
relation its two neighbors were having and the geopolitical competition between them. In 
1980, the Latin American Free Trade Association became the Latin American Integration 
Association - ALADI which, further increased the trade links among the Latin American 
countries. Finally, the conflictive relation between Brazil and Argentina lessened and this 
favored the development of international political cooperation. This decreasing rivalry 
between the two hegemonic countries brought changes into the Río de la Plata Basin. From 
the paradigm of conflict, the region moved to the paradigm of cooperation, concreted into the 
Asuncion Treaty of 1991 and the creation of the MERCOSUR. The latter is an economical 
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agreement with an emphasis on trade and whose first objectives were the formation of a 
customs union and a free trade market. The organization was used as a springboard for the 
strengthening of the relation among its members: Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and 
since 2012, Venezuela. By getting closer, the presidents Raúl Alfonín, José Sarney and Julio 
María Sanguinetti not only changed the dynamic of the Río de la Plata Basin region but also, 
the equilibrium of the whole region of South America
1
. This move towards a more liberalized 
dynamic brought to Uruguay direct foreign investments, deregulation and modernization with 
however, negative social consequences for the population. Overall, at the end of the 1990’s, it 
could be said that thanks to its economic growth, Uruguay had achieved a place into the 
international financial sphere.  
III.C.1.b. FROM 2000 UP TO NOW 
Now that we have a better idea of the history of the foreign policy of Uruguay, let us go 
deeper in this topic by presenting the literature
2
 about how Uruguay shaped its regional 
insertion nowadays. The main current challenge of the Uruguayan foreign policy is “...to 
think about an international insertion that makes possible to ensure its national viability and 
the achievement of standards material growth and social development, to enable it to become 
a prosperous nation in the context of globalization. For this, it must have a Ministry of 
Foreign Policy that strengthens its coordinating role, with a wide and adequate network of 
missions abroad ...”3 
In theory, a country has two options to insert itself into the blocs of the international system: 
getting inserted through bilateral agreements with other blocs or countries or, joining a 
community and from this base, getting inserted. A third option could be the insulation but in 
the actual context of globalization, it is not viable anymore, above all for a small country like 
Uruguay. Between the two options, being alone or joining a group, it is clear that Uruguay has 
chosen the insertion through the region to get involved later into the international system. 
Indeed, in 1991, the policy of integration was adopted in Uruguay as an appropriate way to 
get involved internationally. Leaving apart its European culture, Uruguay favored its 
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condition of Latin American country
1
. However, some experts perceived that the government 
of Jorge Battle Ibáñez (2000-2005) gave little attention to the South American initiative to 
focus instead on other markets access
2
. 
With the upcoming of the first left-wing government in 2005, with at its head Tabaré Vázquez 
from the political party Frente Amplio, this insertion through the region has not changed. The 
government voted a plan, “The Uruguay integrated”, that was clearly in the continuity of the 
previous policy of regional integration. For Uruguay, the region was a platform for its 
integration into the world system
3
. On that perspective, the first goal of the government was 
the MERCOSUR and its expansion. Yet, the construction of paper mills on the River Uruguay 
created a conflict between two partners of the MERCOSUR, Uruguay and Argentina. Since 
the MERCOSUR was suffering from institutional crisis, Uruguay had to expand its tools of 
integration and promoted bilateral relations with other countries of the continent
4
. Following 
that objective, the government put its relation with Venezuela into its circle of priorities. 
However, because of a lack of specific negotiation with Venezuela, Uruguay also attempted to 
improve its bilateral economic relations with the United States. In 2006, Uruguay finally 
dropped the idea to establish a FTA with the United States, more motivated by its model of 
integration based on regional organizations
5
. The former liberal government of Jorge Battle 
Ibáñez from the Partido Colorado was against this relational improvement with the United 




In the view of those events, it seems that, contrarily to its anti-globalization and anti-
multinationals political speeches, the government of Tabaré Vázquez carried out a pragmatic 
policy. Thanks to the construction of two enormous paper mills and the increased exportation 
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of soya, which contributed to the mutation of the agriculture, the Uruguayan economy 
experienced a period of rapid growth
1
. 
The first leftist government period is also market by the negotiation of the external debt of 
Uruguay with the International Monetary Fund - IMF. Consequently to the banking crisis of 
2002, the level of the external debt reached extreme levels in 2004 (13.322 million US$, more 
than 100 % of the national GDP) which was importantly owed to the IMF. After a period of 
preparation of the negotiations in Uruguay in 2004, a Uruguayan delegation went to the 
United States to restructure their debt directly with the IMF and signed a three years stand-by 
arrangement
2




Overall, the first leftist government seems to have carried out a foreign policy oriented 
towards the integration of South America in the medium term, without leaving apart the Latin 
American integration project in the long term. In fact, Uruguay debated on whether choosing 
a model insertion based on diversity, proposed by the ruling majority or, a model of 
integration based on a single pole, either through improved economic relations with the 




From 2010 to 2015, José Mujica, from the same leftist political party as Tabaré Vázquez, the 
Frente Amplio, was at the head of the Uruguayan government. This continuity helped 
Uruguay to follow the project of pro-integration established by the previous government. 
However, public opinion regarding this integration project changed during the ruling period of 
José Mujica, and even within his own party, some skeptical opinions appeared. The 
continuing conflict with Argentina was one of the factors that brought critics over the regional 
integration project in general, and particularly over the MERCOSUR. Even though, the 
project of regional integration remained the key of the foreign policy of Uruguay during the 
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 and the MERCOSUR was one of its top foreign policy priorities
2
. 
Without, however, stopping to look for bilateral trade negotiations outside of the 
organization
3
, José Mujica, following the first steps made by Tabaré Vázquez
4
, also supported 
the project of the UNASUR. This organization gathers nowadays twelve countries of South 
America and has been established in 2008 with the objective “to constitute a space of 
political, economical, social and cultural integration among its people”5. In 2010, by 
ratifying the constitutive treaty of the UNASUR, Uruguay became the ninth country member 
of the organization. Through this ratification, Uruguay expressed its desire to get more 
involved into the project of the South American integration leaded by Brazil. A few times 
after, in 2011, Uruguay, along with thirty two others Latin American and Caribbean countries, 
founded the CELAC, an organization whose purpose is to “create a regional space to affirm 
the Latin American and Caribbean contribution to the democratization of the international 
system”6. This shows that Uruguay focused on both its integration into South and Latin 
America. This period is also marked by growing relations between Uruguay and Venezuela. 
The first leftist government already established stronger relations with the government of 
Hugo Chávez. José Mujica followed this path by supporting, for example, the membership of 
Venezuela to the UNASUR and the MERCOSUR
7
. In 2013, contrarily to the Uruguayan 
tradition, the country got also involved into the Venezuelan political crisis. For example, José 
Mujica and Luis Almagro, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, met Nicolás Maduro, 
candidate for the Venezuelan presidency, in Caracas in November 2013, in order to discuss 
points of their foreign policy agenda. This closer relation between the two countries nourished 
debates in Uruguay where, the opposition was highly critical of those closer ties
8
. 
The year of 2015 marked the beginning of the third government of the party Frente Amplio 
with at its head, Tabaré Vázquez. With an absolute majority in the Parliament, the 
government is free to follow the leftist project of regional integration. By reading the 
                                                 
1
 Caetano, “Uruguay Y Sudamérica,” 129. 
2
 Raúl Bernal-Meza, Modelos O Esquemas de Integración Y Cooperación En Curso En América Latina 
(UNASUR, Alianza Del Pacífico, ALBA, CELAC): Una Mirada Panorámica (Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut, 




 Caetano, “Uruguay Y Sudamérica,” 132–134. 
5
 Free translation of Ruy Carlos Pereira, “El Mercosur Y La Unasur En La Actual Coyuntura,” Voces En El 
Fenix, no. 19 (2012): 34, http://www.vocesenelfenix.com/content/el-mercosur-y-la-unasur-en-la-actual-
coyuntura. 
6
 Free translation of Bruno Ayllón, Tahina Ojeda, and Javier Surasky, “Cooperación Sur – Sur: Regionalismos E 
Integración En América Latina,” Revista Internacional de Cooperación Y Desarrollo 2, no. 1 (August 1, 2015): 
3. 
7
 Ligrone and Guibert, “Montevideo,” 281. 
8
 Clemente Batalla, “La Participación de Uruguay En UNASUR,” 12–13. 
 Review of literature  
34 
 
programme of the party for the presidency from 2015 to 2020, one can have an idea on the 
objective of the foreign policy that the actual government will implement. In its program, the 
government recognizes the importance of “the South-South cooperation; the multilateralism 
with the UN role; the regional platforms such as UNASUR, CELAC, the International 
Cooperation Group MERCOSUR”1. Uruguay will continue to pursue both its South and Latin 
American integration by giving importance to the organizations it belongs to. Further, the 
programme established that the MERCOSUR will be used to impulse the international 
integration of Uruguay. Even if the political party recognizes the deficiencies of the 




More precisely, the programme mentioned the potential of CELAC without forgetting that, 
Uruguay must avoid a duplication of agenda with other organizations. The UNASUR is 
described as an ambitious geographical space promoting democratic regimes and suitable for 
the creation of a new arbitral system. The programme also emphasized the solidarity and 
cooperation promoted by the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – ALBA3 
and declared that, Uruguay should aspire to full membership if it does not interfere with 
MERCOSUR objectives. Finally, regarding the MERCOSUR, along with the amplification of 
its capacities, the programme referred to the full incorporation of Venezuela as a new member 
since 2012
4. In short, Uruguay “will seek to participate in all scenarios for its international 
and trade integration”5. 
III.C.2. URUGUAY AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
The recent literature focusing on Uruguay membership in regional organizations is generally 
analyzing the links between the country and three organizations: the MERCOSUR, the 
UNASUR and the CELAC. Therefore, even if Uruguay also belongs to other organizations 
such as the ALADI, the Latin American and the Caribbean Economic System or the OAS, we 
                                                 
1
 Free translation of Wilson Fernández Luzuriaga, “La Política Exterior Del Uruguay En Las Elecciones 
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Documentos de Trabajo, 2014), 7–8, http://cienciassociales.edu.uy/wp-
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will concentrate our discussion on the relations between Uruguay and the MERCOSUR, the 
UNASUR, and the CELAC.  
In the 1990’s, the Latin American region has experienced a period of “open regionalism” and, 
in lines with the ideas promoted by the Washington Consensus, the region was looking “for 
the integration of its markets via free trade and for the improvement of the export capabilities 
and competitiveness of the regional partners in a globalized world”1. It is during that period 
that the MERCOSUR has been established and nowadays, it is one of the top priorities in the 
foreign policy of Uruguay. However, since its creation in 1991, the organization conditioned 
the foreign policy of Uruguay by changing the rules of the game in the region through a 
greater liberalization. The MERCOSUR became a full actor in the international scene, 
negotiating for itself. In the late 1990’s, Uruguay felt the cost of the greater liberalization 
when Argentina entered in economic recession, when the relation between the two leaders of 
the MERCOSUR, Argentina and Brazil, got worse and, when the internal negotiation stopped 
following the announcement of a new World Trade Organization round. However, the lack of 
alternatives encouraged Uruguay to recognize the opportunities given by the MERCOSUR 
and to continue to put energy in the development and consolidation of the organization. 
The liberal government of Jorge Battle Ibáñez in 2000 considered all the constraints to the 
common market access as prejudices to their country’s interest. Accordingly, it highlighted 
the damage caused to Uruguay by the European common agricultural policy and by the failure 
of the regional commitments from Brazil. The government of Jorge Battle Ibáñez, 
disappointed by Brazil, increased its exports towards the United States with whom they were 
also renegotiating the national debt. For Porzecanski
2
, this position was consistent with the 
project of the government of the "unilateral opening to the world", with the critical judgment 
of the MERCOSUR and, with the decisions of Uruguay to join the bloc of the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas – FTAA3. On the other side, the government of 2000 worked for the 
improvement of the institutional framework of the MERCOSUR. This rather paradoxical 
behavior leaded to confusion among Latin American partners
4
. 
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As already explained, the government of 2005 was also focusing on the MERCOSUR but the 
situation within the organization got worse when Uruguay entered in conflict with Argentina 
about the installation of paper mills on the Uruguay river. The conflict was enough serious for 
Tabaré Vázquez to confess later that he actually asked for the support of George W. Bush in 
case of armed conflict with Argentina
1
. During this conflict, Brazil stayed away from the 
dispute, considering it as bilateral and avoiding its role of sub-regional leader
2
. This crisis let 




The conflict with Argentina did not decrease during José Mujica’s presidency, on the 
contrary. What was a trade conflict at the beginning worsened into a relational conflict 
between the two presidents, José Mujica and Cristina Kirchner. When José Mujica decided to 
increase the production of the problematic factory, Cristina Kirchner forbid the use of 
Uruguayan ports for Argentineans products, what caused heavy damages for the Uruguayan 
port activity
4
. In 2010, the International Court of Justice finally ruled in favor of Uruguay's 
operation of the paper mills
5
. Moreover, during José Mujica’s presidency, it became obvious 
that the MERCOSUR was economically unsatisfactory mainly for the small partners of the 
organization
6
. Indeed, meanwhile Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico managed to establish 
FTAs with the United States, the EU or Asian Pacific countries, the MERCOSUR did not 
close any trade contract with those regions. Actually, the success of the MERCOSUR is more 
political than economical since it helped for the development of the UNASUR
7
. This lacks of 
FTA pushed smaller partners such as Uruguay and Paraguay to look for trade contracts 
outside of the region
8
. During that period, the organization also witnessed a change into the 
leadership and it is now highly linked to the Brazilian political will
9
. The Brazilian leadership 
became obvious not only for the partners of the MERCOSUR but also for the rest of South 
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American countries. This rising image was supported by the fact that Brazil achieved a greater 
role in the world system through its BRICS membership. Therefore, it is not surprising if 




The UNASUR, as the CELAC, are not based on the ideas of economic liberalization, on the 
contrary of the MERCOSUR. Indeed, the Latin American region entered recently in a third 
phase of integration marked by heterogeneity in economic and political terms. Those 
differences and disagreements among countries implied that the project of regionalization 
became more complex than ever and, organizations with different beliefs appeared
2
. Another 
difference between the UNASUR and the MERCOSUR lies on their level of flexibility. While 
the MERCOSUR is perceived as well-institutionalized, strong project of integration, the 
UNASUR benefits from more flexibility and has therefore been able to deal with regional 
issues in an unprecedented way
3
. 
However, both organizations have common features: they both promoted the same principles 
which are “the economic and social development, the democratic stability and the physical 
integration in the region”4. Besides, they are both criticized for their small success and are 




The main challenge for those organizations is to avoid the double regional agenda and to 
become complementary. On that purpose, the MERCOSUR has to continue to promote the 
social and economic development in democracy in the region meanwhile, the UNASUR has 
to become a forum where South American countries can solve South American issues
6
. 
In 2010, Uruguay joined the UNASUR after long national political debates questioning this 
membership. On the one hand, the majority leaded by the Frente Amplio promoted the 
UNASUR as filling their objective of political, social and economic integration of South 
America. They supported their opinion by arguing that the organization already met successes 
in managing conflicts in Colombia, Venezuela or Bolivia. Yet, the opposition perceived the 
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UNASUR as a Brazilian tool to counterbalance the Mexican influence in the region, as 
additional useless international bureaucracy and, as not meeting totally the regional 
integrationist objectives of the country. Indeed, Uruguay has historically debated between two 
options: the integration through the hemisphere (for example, within the OAS) or through the 
Latin American region (for example, within the ECLAC)
1
. Today, while the MERCOSUR is 
still the cornerstone of the continental project of Uruguay, in particular for trade relations, the 
UNASUR became an important place for the development of energy integration projects and 
infrastructure projects. Besides, the attractiveness of the UNASUR for Uruguay is that it 




To finish, Uruguay is also member of the CELAC since 2011. The question is how this 
organization manages to complete the role already played by the UNASUR and the 
MERCOSUR. Here is the answer given by Pereira
3: “in a way, the MERCOSUR is, in relation 
to the UNASUR, what the UNASUR is in relation to the CELAC. The MERCOSUR has a 
trade economical side fairly developed, including the political and civic aspects (…). In turn, 
the UNASUR is born from an inspiration essentially political, and favors more the physical 
and energetic integration than the “classic” trade economical agenda. And the CELAC is a 
more fluid mechanism, designed primarily as a forum for political cooperation among the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, and not as an instance turned toward the 
promotion of “convergence” of the regional and sub-regional integration mechanisms”. 
III.C.3. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
This last sub-section aims to retrace the historical perspective given by accounts focusing on 
Uruguay’s regional role.  
We observed that up to the World War II, the regional dynamic in Latin America was absent. 
Most of the countries, including Uruguay, were still experiencing strong relations with the 
European continent. The European after-war economic slow-down favored the development 
of the regional interrelations. This marked the first development of the regional integration, 
searching for the expansion and independence of the Latin American markets. 
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The second wave of regional integration, generally referred as the “open regionalism” period, 
started in the 1990’s. Influenced by the Washington Consensus, the region implemented 
actively the ideas of economic liberalism. Accordingly to this point of view, Uruguay, along 
with Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, founded the MERCOSUR. At first, Uruguay enjoyed 
from this liberal strategy and experienced a period of economic growth but quickly, following 
the deep recession in Argentina, the country underwent the negative consequences of less 
trade barriers.  
The third wave of regional integration is taking place currently and is marked by 
heterogeneity in economic and political terms. The decreased support to open regionalism and 
the deception of neo-liberalism reforms made room for the apparition of the “left turn” of the 
region: all over the region, leftist or center-leftist governments started to rule, as in Uruguay 
with the Frente Amplio. The region aspires for more independence from the United States as 
well as more regional integration but, on the other hand, fails to establish a common unique 
direction. This period is sometimes referred as post-hegemonic regionalism
1
 moment. 
Accounts actually highlight the loss of hegemony of the United States and the absence of any 
hegemonic model, but rather the coexistence and the overlapping of a plurality of models.  
Uruguay had to build its own strategy within those different regional contexts and waves of 
regionalism. Overall, we observed that, to ensure its national viability, the main challenge of 
this nation is to develop its regional integration to later enhance its international insertion. The 
final goal is to become a prosperous country in the context of globalization. 
III.D. CONCLUSION 
As we have wrote in the introduction of this review of literature, our study will try to keep 
Small States study updated and linked to the new tendencies of the general IR theory, to test 
the solidity of the concept of norm advocacy strategy and finally, to complete the image of 
Uruguay’s regional role by interpreting the impact of its recent noteworthy laws.  
Indeed, reviewing the literature about Small States study, we perceived that it misses a focus 
on ideas and norms, what form the new point of interest of the current general IR theory. 
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Regarding the premise of norm advocacy strategy, it has been mainly applied to case studies 
within the EU and has not been tested enough to be considered as a solid concept. And finally, 
much attention has been dedicated to the MERCOSUR, the UNASUR and the CELAC and 
the position of Uruguay within the organizations. However, the recent pioneering laws 
adopted in Uruguay have not been much studied up to now, even if many newspapers have 
spoken about them. We thus fill this gap by observing the impact of them on Uruguay’s 
regional image and role. 
Now that we have reviewed the sources and the literature related to our topic, let us move to 
the main part of our work: the evaluation of the influence of Uruguay’s polemical laws on the 
Latin American discourse. We proceed chronologically by first analyzing the impact of the 
legalization of abortion, then of same-sex marriage and finally, of cannabis. 
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IV. URUGUAY AND NORM ADVOCACY 
In this part, we determine to which extend Uruguay and it polemical laws on abortion, same-
sex marriage and cannabis influenced the already existing Latin American Discourse. We first 
take a look on some facts on Uruguay to conclude that Uruguay can be characterized as a 
Small State in its region and also to establish the factors that favored the adoption of the 
polemical laws. In the sections IV.B, IV.C and, IV.D, we establish the Latin American 
discourse and its evolution after Uruguay’s law on abortion, same-sex marriage and cannabis 
respectively. Finally, we end the part by describing, in the section IV.E, how the regional role 
of Uruguay evolved consequently to those laws. We attempts to determine if it actually 
increased thanks to norm entrepreneurship.  
IV.A. INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional republic of Uruguay is a southern South American sovereign state, 
bordering the South Atlantic Ocean and located between Argentina and Brazil. The total 
population of Uruguay was 3 419 516 in 2014, nearly half of it leaving in the capital, 
Montevideo. Thanks to the table 3, we can see that, in terms of area, Uruguay is the second 
smallest of the South American countries
1
, after Suriname, the third in terms of population, 
and the fifth in terms of economy. Taking the size or the population as criteria of comparison, 
Uruguay can be considered as a small country of the South American region. Regarding its 
economy, Uruguay is in the middle range of the region but, when we compared it to its two 
neighboring countries, Brazil and Argentina, it is still far from reaching their economic size.  
Therefore, taking the criteria of Geser
2
 exposed in the sub-section “III.A.1 Concept of 
smallness”, Uruguay can definitely be considered as a Small State in its region. 
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Surface area (km²) Total population GDP, Purchasing 
power parity (current 
international $) 
Argentina 2 780 400 42 980 026 960 300 000 000
4
 
Bolivia 1 098 580 10 561 887 70 023 357 901 
Brazil 8 515 770 206 077 898 3 263 866 821 209 
Chile 756 096 17 762 647 396 923 419 130 
Colombia 1 141 749 47 791 393 638 356 789 320 
Ecuador 256 370 15 902 916 180 842 611 839 
Guyana 214 970 763 893 5 234 095 779 
Paraguay 406 752 6 552 518 58 391 810 852 
Peru 1 285 220 30 973 148 371 334 941 443 
Suriname 163 820 538 248 8 955 141 744 
Uruguay 176 220 3 419 516 71 414 080 007 
Venezuela 912 050 30 693 827 553 310 362 410
5
 
The red color means that the value is lower than Uruguay’s value 
The green color means that the value is higher than Uruguay’s value 
The criteria to characterize a state of small are arbitrary and not fixed in the academic field. 
Indeed, as explained in the review of literature, the debate over the concept of smallness did 
not reach any consensus
6
. Therefore, characterizing Uruguay as a Small State can be 





, that further discussion would draw attention away from the more pertinent question of 
this thesis, the testing of the norm advocacy strategy. Besides, the data exposed already justify 
enough our approach and we consider further analysis as irrelevant for our research.  Indeed, 
the main objective of our work is to determine the level of Uruguay’s regional influence and 
to find out if it overweighs its physical size.  
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, social advances turned Uruguay into a 
noteworthy country. As Charbonel explains, “it is the first of the South American continent to 
abolish the death penalty in 1907, to legalize divorce by the will of the wife in 1913, and set 
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up the women's vote in 1927”1. Moreover, it restricted the working day to eight hours2 and 
decriminalized the alcohol consumption, prostitution and gambling
3
. Three factors could 
justify this vanguard and liberal movement in Uruguay in the beginning of the previous 
century. First, as argued by Adolfo Garcé
4
, professor of social sciences at the Republic 
University of Montevideo, the massive European immigration favored the development of a 
progressive and secular political culture in Uruguay. Second, and related to the first factor, 
Uruguay turned into a pioneering country in secularization when the church and state were 
formally separated in 1917
5
. Ultimately and thirdly, this period of liberal fever is also 
recognized as the legacy of the charismatic President José Batlle y Ordoñez, president 
between 1903-1907 and 1911-1915, whose ideas can be described as influenced by the French 
radicalism but nuanced by the social and secular touches of a passionate humanitarianism
6
.  
This past liberal stance on social issues has significantly facilitated the ambitious regulation 
initiatives took by Uruguay recently
7
. Those social progresses made by the political party 
Frente Amplio have put Uruguay in the front stage of its region
8
. This social advancement of 
Uruguay is not just attributed to those laws but is also present in other areas of the society. 
Indeed, Uruguay classified at the top, for the second consecutive year, of the annual 2015 
Americas Quarterly Social Inclusion Index. The latter “compares 22 variables - including 
economic and social data, as well as public opinion results - across 17 countries, providing a 
detailed portrait of a region that is making progress while grappling with unique 
challenges”9. This report particularly emphasized the leadership of Uruguay in terms of 
LGBT rights.  
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Nationally, after two years of struggle in 2010 and 2011, the executive power finally managed 
to convince the parliament to pass those three laws
1
. This was welcomed because it helped the 
government to keep their libertarian left electorate and to improve the image of the President 
that, in other areas of public policy, had been deteriorated due to some management results
2
. 
Those social progresses were leaded and highly promoted by the libertarian part of the Frente 
Amplio but, the rest of the party, more oriented towards traditional left ideas, showed some 
concerns regarding those polemical laws. At the end, the Frente Amplio succeeded to unite its 
own diverging tendencies
3
. In addition to the challenge of the mix of two different left 
tendencies, the government of José Mujica also managed “to combine a libertarian policy 
agenda with a clear orientation towards the market economy, without neglecting one of the 
most developed welfare states of the continent”4. 
Which factors explain the recent adoption of those polemical laws? Part of the answer is given 
by Aguiar and Arocena
5
. The first element highlighted by the authors is of course the 
secularism aspect of the Uruguayan society. Since the Constitution of 1917, Church and state 
are officially separated in Uruguay
6
. This strong secularism is, for instance, demonstrated 
recently in a survey conducted among six Latin American countries where, Uruguay appeared 
to have the population the more distant from the moral doctrine of the Church
7
. Another study 
evaluated that 38 % of Uruguayans identify themselves as “agnostics”, “atheists”, or not 
affiliated to any religion. This is the highest proportion of the eighteen Latin American 
countries studied in the survey, the second being Chile with 25 %
8
. Second, the good 
conjuncture that the country is experiencing is also a factor justifying the approbation of those 
laws: the democracy has reached a fully developed stage, the economical annual growth rate 
is around 5 % for the last ten years, and equality is increasing thanks to wealth redistribution 
policy
9
. This context of stability helped the country to focus on the importance of human 
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rights. Third, Uruguay took advantage of its innovative past and José Mujica explicitly surfed 
on the convergence of those two periods. Fourth, the first recent social progress made by 
Uruguay in the legalization of abortion on demand opened the way for other social progresses 
to happen. The three movements that we analyze further were indeed helping each other in the 
sense that they were claiming rights that give space to each other. Those laws can be referred 
as the consequence of the work of a young activist generation supporting and promoting a 
social renewal. Actually, those laws not only share contemporaneity but also reciprocal 
solidarity. Finally, to the arguments used by Aguiar and Arocena, it is important to highlight 
the fact that in comparison to the previous ruling parties since the end of the dictatorship in 
1985, the Frente Amplio is the first party to benefit from a majority at the parliament. 
Previously, the Partido Colorado and the Partido Nacional, the two major political parties 
before 2005, had to deal with governing coalitions
1
. 
Those three laws also fit the Uruguayan long tradition of respect of human rights. The later 
constitutes a pillar of the Uruguayan society. This is for example illustrated by the Section IIa 
“Rights, Duties and Guarantees” of the Constitution of the Uruguayan state, which gives 
human rights an important role
2
. Two Articles particularly emphasize the importance of 
human rights for Uruguay, namely the Article 7 stating that “The inhabitants of the Republic 
have the right to be protected in the enjoyment of their life, honor, freedom, security, work 
and property. No one can be deprived of these rights except in accordance with the laws 
established for reasons of general interest”3 and the Article 72 stating that “The enumeration 
of rights, duties and guarantees made by the Constitution does not exclude others that are 
inherent to the human personality or derived from the republican form of the government”4. 
Moreover, the organization Freedom House
5
 calculated that in 2015, Uruguay reached a level 
of freedom of 98 out of 100, an extremely high score and above the regional trend. For 
instance, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Brazil got respectively 79, 95, 64 and 81
6
. Nevertheless, 
the organization spotted several drawbacks in terms of freedom in Uruguay. First, the court 
system remains severely delayed, resulting in overcrowded prisons and poor conditions of 
detention. Second, the strategy developed by Uruguay to bring to justice those responsible of 
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human rights violations committed under the dictatorship suffers from serious drawbacks. 
Third, people of African and indigenous descent still suffer from economical and social 
inequalities. Finally, violence against women is still a serious problem in Uruguay
1
. All those 
drawbacks have also been mentioned by the Committee of the UN Human Rights in the 
consideration of Uruguay’s report. However, “Committee Members commended Uruguay for 
being a pioneer in many areas of human rights”2. As Luis Almagro declared at the 65th Period 
Session of the UN General Assembly, “Uruguay has a long tradition of defense, promotion 
and protection of the human rights and the international humanitarian law. These principles 
are a central priority for the State, framed within the traditional pillars of the foreign policy 
of the Republic, what constitute the basic political and institutional asset of the country”3. We 
see therefore that the respect of human rights is a central value and priority for Uruguay. 
There is an undeniable link between the three vanguard laws and this human rights value. 
Indeed, as we will see later, the laws all aim to improve the respect of human rights.  
Now that we understand the context in which the three polemical laws were taken, we will 
enter into the core of our research and try to establish the importance of their impact on Latin 
American countries. The objective is to determine whether the behavior of Uruguay 
influenced the rest of the countries of the region. If Uruguay did affect the Latin American 
discourse, our task will be to settle on if it helped Uruguay to gain more power at the regional 
level. In 2013, Uruguay as been declared as the country of the year by the magazine The 
Economist who declared, for this occasion, that “the most noteworthy achievements are, we 
believe, those innovative reforms that not only are limited to improve a country but if 
imitated, could benefit the world”4. The question of influence and imitation of those social 
initiatives was already in discussion. Our research will constitute a first element of answer. 
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The abortion and its legalization are generally a sensitive and polemical topic that provokes 
fierce debate in highly religious regions such as Latin America. In that region, as explained by 
Motta
1
, the Catholic Church has a great influence on the discourse on abortion. Catholic 
moral considers abortion as inadmissible because of the sacred nature of life, inviolable and 
absolute, even in case of rape. Putting an end to a pregnancy, for whichever reason, is 
intolerable and considered as having taken the life of a person. The Law has been used by the 
Catholic Church to reinforce the implementation of its moral. 
On the other hand, in opposition to the Catholic moral, since the 1980’s, liberalism and 
feminism put the accent on women’s rights for self-decision over what concerns their body. 
Some of their arguments in favor of abortion legalization are based on rejecting the belief that 
the fetus is a person and on favoring the health, life and autonomy of the women. Other 
arguments highlight the moral capacity of a woman to decide what is best for her body, not 
focusing on the human condition of the fetus. Overall, this approach represents a change of 
paradigm, moving towards sexual and reproductive rights
2
. 
In Latin America, first steps towards safe abortion have been made in 1994, during the 
International Conference on Population and Development - ICPD in Cairo. 179 participating 
states reached a consensus according to which, the state has the duty to provide a 
humanitarian treatment to women proceeding to abortion, yet not promoting abortion as a 
family planning method. The mid-1990’s is thus the period for Latin America to open the 
debate over abortion. The region experienced confrontations between political libertarians and 
feminists, and Catholic and social conservative groups
3
. Currently, any punishment of 
abortion is considered by the general trend of international law as a violation of women’s 
human rights, in line with the arguments of liberalism and feminism
4
. 
More recently, some facts acted in favor of the legalization of abortion in Latin America: the 
stability of democracy, the increasing number of female political leaders and the growing 
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middle class. The region also experienced changes towards more socially oriented policies. 
All this favored the development of the importance given to the decriminalization of abortion. 
On the other hand, some other factors, such as the still high socioeconomic inequalities, slow 




IV.B.1. URUGUAY’S VISION 




 explain, the debate about abortion in Uruguay dates back 
from 1933 when the authoritarian and conservative regime took the decision to decriminalize 
it. At that moment, only the Soviet Union had already legalized abortion. In Uruguay, it 
happened so because the person in charge of drafting the Criminal Code was in favor of legal 
abortion. However, in 1938, massive protests from conservative doctors and politicians leaded 
to the reform of the Criminal Code and abortion became again outlawed. Yet, the law was not 
strict and conducted to rather light punishments
4
. When sentencing a leeway, judges benefited 
from a large space of maneuver and few cases were actually prosecuted
5
. After the collapse of 
the dictatorship in 1985, the debate over the legalization of abortion restarted and the 
Uruguayan Congress discussed it several times. In 2008, the President Vázquez himself, who 
studied medicine, stopped the legalization of abortion by vetoing the bill already approved by 
both chambers of the Congress. In total, since 1985, seven attempts to pass a bill over legal 
abortion failed
6
.   
In October 2012, the bill vetoed by Tabaré Vázquez resurrected and the Uruguayan Congress 
approved a bill to legalize abortion on demand within the first twelve weeks, and in case of 
rape, within the first fourteen weeks
7
. The Law N° 18.987 ruling the VIP has been 
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promulgated in December 2012
1
. Uruguay became thus “the third nation in Latin America to 
decriminalize abortion”2, after Cuba and Guyana. In Latin America, abortion was already 
legal also in the following territories: French Guyana, Mexico’s Federal District and Puerto 
Rico. 
The project of decriminalization only raised few objections within the ruling party Frente 
Amplio on the contrary of the opposition, who was strongly against it. Actually, even if 
Uruguay is considered as highly liberal, the legalization of abortion provoked fierce debates 
within the country
3
. However, the approval of the bill has been possible thanks to a large 
consensus together with the pressure of activist left-wing groups
4
. Indeed, the law has been 
achieved partly thanks to an eleven years campaign for decriminalization, led by women 
organizations and based on the three following strategies: “raising awareness through skillful 
framing of the issue, obtaining support from key social actors to increase legitimacy, and 
working closely with leftist legislators”5. The evolution of the Uruguayan public opinion also 
helped for the decriminalization of abortion. Indeed, in 2007, 61 % of the population agreed 
that abortion should be legal, a number illustrating the growing acceptance of abortion since 
1933, when this percentage was 55 %
6
. In fact, in comparison to other Latin American 
countries, abortion is more easily accepted in Uruguay because, abortion is generally more 
tolerated “by men of 40 years or younger, highly educated, of low level of property 
deprivation, of low level of religiosity, and who do not profess the Catholic or Evangelical 
faith”7, what best corresponds to Uruguay’s situation. 
Yet, according to some accounts
8
, abortion in Uruguay cannot be considered as totally legal 
since it is only granted under the meeting of three conditions: the approval of a panel of, at 
least, three healthcare and social work professionals, the attendance to an information session 
about abortion related to health risk and alternatives and, after that, a five days period of 
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reflection before the realization of the procedure. This partial success and those shortcomings 
have been highly criticized by many women organizations that fought for legal abortion. In 
reaction to those critics, the Senator Monica Xavier, who sponsored the bill and supports 
decriminalization since 1995, responded that the law was the best that could be achieved for 
now. Yet, she also expressed her awareness of the necessity to continue to struggle for the 
relaxing of those requirements
1
. 
After the promulgation of the Law, José Mujica declared that abortion is "the most rational 
method to save the biggest number of lives"
2
. In fact, the law on abortion has been supported 
by two main arguments: first, the woman’s rights to decide over their pregnancy; second, the 
necessity the end with the network of clandestine clinics which put in danger women’s life. 
Those clinics are mainly used by women of low income that cannot access higher quality 
services because of lack of financial capacity
3
. Uruguay is looking for the reduction of the 
maternal mortality rate which was already, according to the World Bank Data
4
, the third 
lowest in the whole American continent, after Canada and the United States. According to 
Ministry of Public Health, between December 2012 and November 2013, 6 676 legal VIP 
have been conducted
5
; in 2014, this number reached the level of 8 500. This represents an 
increase of 20 % between 2013 and 2014. Between the two years, the Ministry of Public 
Health also noticed an increase of 30 % in the number of women who decided to maintain 
their pregnancy after consulting the interdisciplinary team. 9 % of the women actually take 
that decision
6
. Observing those results, Professor Briozzo, undersecretary of Public Health 
during 2010-2015, declared at the 29
th
 UN General Assembly Special Session - UNGASS in 
2014 that “Uruguay has reached the 5th of the 8 Millennium Development Goals, to reduce 
maternal mortality, before 2015, the date agreed in 2000 by the UN”7. 
The country argues that the criminalization of abortion must end because it is responsible of 
discrimination, of more deaths, and even of more abortions. If the decriminalization is not 
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achievable, Uruguay recommended other countries, during the Second Meeting of the 
Regional Conference on Population and Development of ECLAC in Mexico City in 2015, to 
implement a model capable to reduce the risks related to abortion, as already suggested by the 
ICPD platform in Cairo in 1994
1
. Actually, Uruguay based its recommendations on its own 
experience in the development of such a model. Indeed, from 2001 to 2012, the state 
programme Iniciativas Sanitarias, founded and directed by Professor Briozzo developed the 
Uruguayan model for risks and harms reduction in unsafe abortions, through counseling 
centers and informative sessions pre and post-abortion
2
. Successes of this model
3
 called 
“Changing relationships in the health care context: the Uruguayan model for reducing the risk 
and harm of unsafe abortions” have been acknowledged in 2012 by the Pan American Health 
Organization - PAHO who, selected the programme as the best practice at the regional level, 
and recommended it for other countries with restrictive abortion laws. Professor Briozzo 
presented this model at different occasions and in particular, in a special session prior to the 
opening of the First Meeting of the Regional Conference on Population and Development in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, organized in Montevideo in 2013 and presided by Professor 
Briozzo himself
4
. In general, when presenting the model of his country, Professor Briozzo 
highlights the importance of public health rather than the women’s rights5. According to his 
words, “the best way to approach decriminalization in Latin America is by focusing on harm 
reduction. First, it provides a solution to women whose life and health are at risk, and second, 
it can bring about change in people’s attitudes that can lead to a law like Uruguay’s”6. All in 
all, as Anderson declares, it seems that “the Uruguayan experience offers important lessons 
for similar struggles elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean”7. 
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IV.B.2. INFLUENCE ON THE LATIN AMERICAN DISCOURSE 
By looking to the numbers related to abortion in Latin or South America, one can understand 
the important scale of this problem. Indeed, first, the proportion of unintended pregnancies is 
extremely high in Latin America and Caribbean, 58 % in 2008, and more particularly in South 
America, 64 % in 2008
1
. No other major region in the world overcomes the rate of South 
America. This may be explained by a lack of consciousness or accessibility of contraceptives. 
Besides, unintended pregnancies may “result from poor couple communication, 
nonconsensual sex, economic constraints on women’s lives, and cultural expectations, such as 
for young women to remain virginal and uneducated about sex” 2. 
Second, according to the Guttmacher Institute, in Latin America and Caribbean, “97% of 
women of childbearing age in the region live in countries where the abortion law is highly 
restrictive”3. The region is considered as the home of world’s most restrictive abortion laws. 
The Center for Reproductive Rights reported that in the world, only four countries state that 
abortion is illegal, with no exceptions, among which three are in Latin America and 
Caribbean, i.e. Chile, El Salvador, and Nicaragua (the fourth is Malta)
4
. Chile is however 
taking steps towards a less prohibitive law: the Chilean Chamber of Deputies has approved, in 
March 2016, the legalization of abortions in cases of rape, fetal impairment and risks for the 
mother’s health. The text still must be approved by the Senate5. On the other hand, the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, and Suriname also prohibit abortion without making 
clear reference in their law to exception in case of danger for woman’s life6. Yet, in general in 
Latin America, abortion is allowed under some conditions, “such as when the mother’s life is 
at risk, the fetus will not live, or the pregnancy results from rape”7. Nevertheless, in reality, 
those exceptions do not guarantee women meeting the conditions to have access to safe 
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abortion in public health service
1
. It is frequently not as easy; for example, rape victims “are 
often denied services by physicians, prohibitive procedure costs, and unnecessarily stringent 
requirements”2. 
As a consequence of this high rate of unintended pregnancies and the illegality of abortion in 
rule in most of the countries of the region, women in Latin America and the Caribbean are at 
high risk of mortality when they practice clandestine abortions. Despite this danger and the 
criminalization of abortion, women still resort massively to this practice
3
. In comparison with 
other regions in the world, the level of abortion in South America is extremely high: in 2008, 
it has been calculated that about 3,1 % of women between the ages of 15 and 45 practice 
abortions each year meanwhile, in Netherlands, this same figure is 0,8 %
4
. Yet, what is even 
more striking is the risk that those abortions involve for women: the Guttmacher Institute has 
estimated in 2012 that in Latin America and the Caribbean, 95 % of the 4.4 million of the 
yearly abortions are unsafe and are responsible for 12% of maternal mortality
5
. Another 
problem related to illegal abortion is the respect of the professional secrecy from the medical 
staffs. The illegality of abortion engages a conflict between their duty of professional secrecy, 
a right for patients, and their obligation to report signs of illegal abortion. In various countries 
such as Peru, Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica, and Argentina, medical staffs cannot invoke the 
medical secrecy when they are convened by the Police for a case of illegal abortion. The right 
of privacy of the patient is thus trampled
6
.  
The rate of abortion practiced by women between the ages of 15 and 45 has however declined 
between 1990 and 2008, from 4,5 % to 3,1 %. This period also corresponds to a period of 
sustained fertility decline in South America. This may be the result of sharp rise in 
contraceptive prevalence
7
 and access to emergency contraceptive. Nonetheless, the latter is 
still under ethical debate and some legal restrictions in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
opponents to its use consider it as abortive, despite scientific evidence of the contrary
8
. The 
safety of clandestine abortion has also increased recently thanks to the spreading use of 
misoprostol, “a synthetic prostaglandin, which softens and dilates the cervix and stimulates 
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uterine contractions”1 and leads to medical abortion. Misoprostol first has been used in Brazil 
in the mid-1980’s to treat incomplete abortion and soon, it improved the security of self-
induced abortion
2
. The use of misoprostol spread rapidly to other countries of the region and 
therefore, decreased the danger of illegal abortions
3
. Lastly, following the 1994 ICPD, some 
improves have been made also regarding the postabortion care services. The protocol that 
clinics have to follow in case of abortion changed slightly its objective from the mere 
restriction to the provision of postabortion care
4
.  
Overall, the Latin American and Caribbean region needs to deal with the issue of high level of 
risky and illegal abortions. Figures show that, despite the high degree of legal restiveness on 
abortion and the danger that the practice involves, women still perform abortions. Actually, 
restrictive laws on abortion enable a part of the population to be comforted in the idea that life 
of unborn children is protected although, in practice, legal restrictions on abortion result in 
more dangerous abortions to the cost of women’s life5.  
In Western Europe and North America, abortion became liberalized between the late 1960’s 
and the 1980’s. Considering the influence that this region has generally over Latin America, it 
is surprising that this liberalization, instead of spreading, caused a backlash effect in some 
cases. This is even more surprising since Latin American countries did make legal progresses 
on other gender issues such as, among others, divorce, domestic violence, and labor law
6
. 
What can explain this position of the Latin American region? First, and undeniably, the 
Catholic Church in Latin America was far more mobilized against abortion than in United 
States or Europe, representing stronger obstacles for legal abortion defenders
7
. The Catholic 
Church, along with strong anti-abortion activists, was highlighting the obligation “to protect 
the lives of those who are not yet born, the social, moral and family order”8. Second, 
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according to abortion opinion studies
1
, the fact that abortion is not perceived as a public 
health issue or as resulting from social inequalities may be the result of “its moralistic 
treatment by the media, limited awareness about different aspects of the issue and, 
patriarchal influences”2. 
Legal abortion defenders however became more active recently and slow legal transformation 
is taking place in Latin America. The restriction over abortion is challenged by arguments 
based on public health and social justice instead of religious considerations
3
. The following 
paragraphs will set up the image of those changes, focusing on the role played by Uruguay in 
this change of discourse. 
Since the late 1990’s, law on abortion in Latin America evolved, not all into a more 
permissive situation. El Salvador is the first country of the region to make steps towards a 
more restrictive law. The country amended its constitution in 1998 to remove all the legal 
grounds under which abortion was previously allowed
4
 and in 1999, it took a step further 
when amending anew its constitution to protect the right to life from the conception, granting 
the fetuses a legal status
5
. In 2006, Nicaragua also amended its penal code to outlaw all the 
legal grounds, such as therapeutic abortion, that previously permitted the practice
6
. Finally, in 
2008, the Dominican Republic followed the path of the two first countries by amending its 
constitution to recognize that human life begins at the conception
7
. 
On the other hand, some countries moved towards more permissive laws. For instance, in 
2012, Argentina eased the access to abortion for women victims of rape
8
 and as a result, 
“courts have gradually established the doctrine that judicial authorization is not necessary 
when the situation is expressly established by the law”9. In the same year, Brazil legalized 
abortion of anencephalic fetuses
10
 although, no profound reform of abortion law has taken 
place since. And in 2015, the parliament entered a project of law that will further hinder 
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access to abortion for rape victims. The bill requires the women to denounce rape and to 
undergo a medical examination in addition to go through several interviews
1
. Additionally to 
Uruguay, the most important reforms happened in Mexico and Colombia. Mexico Federal 
District fully legalized abortion during the first semester in 2007
2
. Nevertheless, figures show 
that women still face some restrictions “to accessing services related to cost, distance, social 
stigma, and the low number of facilities offering abortions”3. Mexico Federal District law had 
only a minor positive influence on other Mexican states, most of them even adopting more 
restrictive laws and taking constitutional amendments recognizing the inviolability of life 
from conception
4
. In 2006, after five attempts, Colombia finally extended the scope of 
abortion to the cases of threats to woman’s life, rape and malformation of fetus but, since 
then, no further extensions of the law has occurred
5
. In the “VIII.A. Annex 1: Latin America 
and Caribbean’s law on abortion”, a map illustrates the status of the law on abortion in 2013 
in Latin America and Caribbean. The following table classifies countries of Latin America 
and Caribbean according to the current status of the law on abortion: 
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Table 4: Legality of abortion in Latin America and Caribbean
1
 
Prohibited, with no exception or no explicit legal 
exception to save woman’s life 
Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador 
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Suriname 
Only allowed to save woman’s life Antigua and Barbuda, Brazil (a), 
Dominica, Guatemala, Mexico (a, c), 
Panama (a, c, e), Paraguay, Venezuela 
Only allowed to save woman’s life and physical 
health 
Argentina (a), Bahamas, Bolivia (a, b), 
Costa Rica, Ecuador (a), Grenada, Peru 
Only allowed to save woman’s life and physical and 
mental health 
Colombia (a, b ,c), Jamaica (e), St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Lucia (a, b), Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Only allowed on socioeconomic and broad health 
grounds 
Barbados (a, b, c, e), Belize (d), St. 
Vincent and Grenadines (a, c, d) 
Allowed (during the 1
st
 semester) with no restriction  Cuba (e), Guyana, Uruguay, (French 
Guyana, Mexico Federal District Puerto 
Rico) 
Countries allow abortion in case of: 
(a) Rape 
(b) Incest 
(c) Fetal impairment 
Countries allow abortion only with: 
(d) Spousal authorization 
(e) Parental authorization 
In Mexico, the legality of abortion is determined at the state level, and the legal categorization listed here reflects 
the status for the majority of women 
We saw that in the past few years, even if few significant steps have been made towards legal 
abortion, the debate took a greater space in the political life of some countries closed to 
Uruguay. The objective of the following paragraphs is to establish in which country or 
regional international organizations, Uruguay influenced the discourse on abortion. 
Chile is known to live according to a double discourse on morals and ethics, showing public 
intolerance, but tacit tolerance, on socials religious matters such as abortion
2
. This implies 
that fertility regulation is considered as a private matter and is barely challenged by 
politicians, as it happened during the first presidency of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010). As 
the country’s first female president, she managed to make progress on women’s rights in 
educational opportunities, labor and marriages law, and political representation. Yet, the issue 
of reproductive rights such as emergency contraception or abortion remained unchanged
3
. 
During the presidency of her successor, Sebastián Piñera Echeniquen (2010-2014), fervent 
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opponent to legal abortion, absolutely no progress has been made. However, some experts 
such as Lidia Casa, Professor at the Diego Portales University Law School in Santiago, 
predicted that “Chilean advocates might follow Uruguay’s example, building supportive 
coalitions and strengthening doctor-patient confidentiality before moving toward a full 
change of legislation”1. And actually, during the beginning of her second presidency (2014-
…), Michelle Bachelet showed signs of willingness to deal with the issue of abortion. In a 
speech to the Congress in 2014, she declared that “her government would promote legislation 
decriminalizing abortion in cases of rape, risk to the woman’s life, or in which the fetus is 
unable to survive outside the womb”2. In March 2016, her willingness became concrete when 
the Chamber of Deputies of Chile approved the law of VIP in case of rape, risks for the 
mother’s life and non-viability of the fetus. The law is actually under the examination of the 
Senate
3
. When the government entered the law in the congress, the Chilean President 
commented that “neither the State nor anybody can force them [women] in their right to be or 
not to be mothers”4. This governmental initiative of one of the strictest country on abortion of 
Latin America illustrates the tendency of the region to expand access to abortion
5
. 
In the case of Argentina, even if the female political representation is high due to the adoption 
of gender quotas
6
, abortion is still under strict rules. In March 2015, the former Health 
Minister of Argentina, Daniel Gollán, stated his intentions to initiate a “mature debate with all 
sectors of society” regarding abortion and argued that one possibility is to establish a model 
based on counseling centers, before fully legalizing it, as Uruguay did. He said that “one of 
the possibilities is the way that Uruguay took, with counseling centers, even before the legal 
abortion law. In Uruguay, they were excellent results and 30 % of those women who went to 
counseling centers with the intention to abort, decided not to do it”7. Nonetheless, the Chief 
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of the Cabinet of Ministers, Anibal Fernandez, rapidly denied Daniel Gollán’s declarations by 
affirming that the issue of abortion was not on the government’s agenda1. 
In Paraguay, some politicians such as Gabriela Schwartzman, candidate for the national 
Congress, took advantage from the debate happening in the region to try to open the 
discussion in their country. In her view, the debate on the legalization of abortion should be 
open to find solutions to the high rate of mortality of women in clandestine practices
2
. The 
Minister for Women’s Affairs, Gloria Rubín said that she followed closely the process of 
decriminalization held in Uruguay but also recalled that in Paraguay, contrarily to Uruguay, 
the religious lobby anti-abortion remains strong
3
. 
As we can see, the influence of the abortion law of Uruguay on Latin American and 
Caribbean countries is rather limited. Few politicians used directly the Uruguayan example to 
open debate in their home country. Nevertheless, as we will see in the next paragraphs, the 
experience of Uruguay in terms of safe abortion impacted the discourse of different regional 
organizations. 
The PAHO is the first international organization to recognize the expertise of Uruguay in 
promoting safe abortions by priming the model “Changing relationships in the health care 
context: the Uruguayan model for reducing the risk and harm of unsafe abortions” in 2012. 
Similar as a “social lab”, the Uruguayan situation in terms of health systems and institutions 
enabled an effective evaluation of the model. This has shown positive effects in reducing risk 
and harm of unsafe abortions. The PAHO believes that “model can be replicated and adapted 
to other countries where there are legal limitations for abortion, and it provides an immediate 
solution for women facing the harsh reality of an unwanted pregnancy”4.  
Aware of this positive evaluation of the Uruguayan model, the OAS invited Professor Briozzo 
to expose it to the permanent council of the organization. After Professor Briozzo’s 
presentation, “the representatives of Venezuela and Dominica congratulated the Uruguayan 
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health professionals on their work”1. In addition, in 2013, the OAS recommended, for the 
first time, to all its member states to decriminalize abortion in cases of sexual violence and 
incest, danger for the health or life of the woman and non-viability of the fetus
2
. Ultimately, 
during another debate on abortion in the OAS, José Miguel Insulza, the former Secretary 
General of the OAS, declared that “the penalty is punitive for women. Nobody aborts because 
they want to”. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile argued that “the number of 
clandestine abortions that are made without sanitary control is a huge social problem in our 
countries”. He further expressed that he is “completely against abortion and do not know 
anyone who is in favor, but that is not the point; the point is that it happens and you have to 
deal with it. I ask us to have the most open mind possible on this issue. We must put aside 
prejudices for dialogue. It is an issue that must be addressed seriously in societies”3. 
Finally, and more importantly, Uruguay organized jointly with the ECLAC, supported by the 
UN Population Fund, the First Regional Conference on Population and Development in 
Montevideo from the 12
th
 to the 15
th
 of August 2013. “The meeting gathered 24 regional and 
international organizations and 260 non-governmental organizations, with a total audience 
that exceeded 800 people, making it one of the largest intergovernmental meetings in recent 
years in the region”. Official representatives of 38 member and associate countries of the 
ECLAC adopted at the end of the conference the Montevideo Consensus on Population and 
Development
4
. “The Consensus includes more than 120 measures on eight themes identified 
as priorities to follow up the Programme of Action ICPD, held in Cairo in 1994” 5. In 
particular, the signing parties of the Consensus committed “to ensure, in cases where abortion 
is legal or decriminalized in national legislation, the existence of safe an quality abortion 
services for women enrolled in unwanted and unaccepted pregnancies and to urge other 
States to consider to change the laws, regulations, strategies and public policies on abortion 
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to safeguard the life and health of women and adolescents, by improving their quality of life 
and reducing the number of abortions”1. 
Uruguay, as an organizer and through the personality of Professor Briozzo, chairman of the 
Conference, played a leading role during the Conference. This leadership has been recognized 
by some activists who see the progress made during the Conference as the result of the 
Uruguayan action. For instance, Daptnhe Cuevas, from the Health Network of Latin 
American and Caribbean Women, declared that “traditionally, we are facing, in many areas 
of the United Nations system, a base document that is usually a document that does not hurt 
too much anyone’s callosity, and if you start to negotiate down, you are not necessarily going 
to win. Uruguay put a high starting point, and that enabled us to get a negotiation in which 
countries had fewer possibilities of demagogic and ideological dialogues”2. 
The experience of Uruguay in terms of progress in safe abortions has also been recognized in 
the north of the continent. For instance, Professor Briozzo has been invited by the Inter-
American Dialogue and the Center for Reproductive Rights in 2014 to present the Uruguayan 
situation about abortion. The objective of the symposium was “to focus the Washington policy 
community’s attention on the state of reproductive rights in Latin America”3. The fact that 
Uruguay was one of the six Latin American countries represented is a proof of certain 
recognition from the north of the continent.  
Besides, Uruguay chaired the 47
th
 Session of the UN Commission on Population and 
Development, which main purpose was the follow up of the Plan of Action of the 1994 ICPD. 
As Professor Briozzo suggested at the 29
th
 UNGASS in 2014, this presidency along with the 
Montevideo Consensus “positioned Uruguay into a privileged place to progress in the 
definition of the Post 2015 Agenda”4. 
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The next sub-section presents the conclusion that we can establish following the presentation 
of the evolution of the Latin American discourse on abortion and the influence of Uruguay’s 
stance on it. 
IV.B.3. CHANGES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN DISCOURSE? 
Through the presentation of the different abortions law status around the Latin American 
region, we became aware that in most of the countries, abortion is still perceived as a religious 
matter instead as a reproductive right or, a health issue. Nonetheless, public discourse in 
different countries starts to evolve and, even if the decriminalization is not quickly spreading, 
countries show interest in adopting new strategies or policies to reduce unsafe abortions.  
Some newspapers presented the Uruguayan law as a reference point and reviver of the 
abortion debate in Latin America
1
. However, this idea seems partly right since we have seen 
that few political leaders referred to Uruguay’s example to support their intention to 
decriminalize abortion. Actually, abortion activists have developed a wait-and-see approach 
in the respect of the law in Uruguay, looking for the results achieved by the country. Besides, 
Uruguay is characterized by a unique context due to its smallness, cultural homogeneity, 
secularization and liberal stance. Those aspects turn Uruguay has a perfect “social lab” for 
experiments that may be hard to imitate in other more complex countries. In fact, some 
accounts
2
 described the progresses made in Mexico Federal District and in Colombia as more 
significant. According to this literature, “the reforms in Colombia and Mexico showed 
regional advocates the feasibility of changing attitudes and policies in a socially and 
politically conservative environment”3. Those reforms showed that the obstacle of the 
Catholic Church may be overcome. Actually, because of this particular secular and social 
vanguard position, Uruguay would rather be described as an inspiration for other states 
instead as a real influential actor. To express this situation, Mónica Arango, regional director 
for Latin America and the Caribbean of the Center for Reproductive Rights, argued that she 
“wouldn’t say it would create a domino effect, but it would set a clear example of an evolving 
law and of respect and protection for women’s rights”4. 
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On the other hand, the experience of Uruguay to develop a model for prevention of unsafe 
abortions has been recognized several times by different regional organizations such as the 
PAHO and the OAS. Since the development of its model, Uruguay has been invited to share 
its expertise in the area in conferences and meetings related to reproductive rights. Besides, 
Uruguay has been one of the initiator and leader of the First Regional Conference on 
Population and Development that leaded to the Consensus of Montevideo, supporting 
progresses towards legalization of abortion. On that prospect, the role played by Professor 
Briozzo, as initiator, creator and expert of the model, seems to have been crucial. Therefore, 
we can conclude that, even if Uruguay’s abortion law did not impact significantly national 
politicians of the other Latin American countries, its expertise and success in dealing with the 
issue is considerably recognized and acknowledged by the region. In fact, Uruguay is 
indirectly influencing other countries by its action and dialogue within the main international 
organizations of the region. The latter worked as a platform for Uruguay to spread its 
progressive vision on abortion, moving away from the Catholic Church morale. 
IV.C. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
The legal recognition of same-sex couples is one of the main demands of the pro-LGBT rights 
movement. While the movement was initially opposed to any intervention from the State into 
the sexual orientation of citizens, it asked later for the State protection and acknowledgement 
thanks to, among others, the recognition of the community into the legal system. In that 
prospect, the LGBT movement fights for the ability of same-sex couples to get married or to 
have access to a legal recognition
1
. The aim of this legal recognition is not only the protection 
of the community but also, the removal of the injustice that lies in the exclusive legal 
recognition of heterosexual unions
2
. The law not recognizing homosexual unions, in that 
sense, represents a system of beliefs, values discriminating this community. 
This demand causes fierce debates within the society and even within the movement in favor 
of sexual diversity. Indeed, part of the population believes “that marriage is exclusively 
heterosexual and that any legal recognition of couples that diverge from this norm implies 
“denaturalizing” an institution that has been crucial for social order”3. The Catholic Church, 
highly active in Latin America, as well as its allies, usually use this argument to defend their 
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position opposed to the legal acknowledgement of same-sex couples
1
. Regarding the LGBT 
movement itself, part of it rejects any form of institution promoted by a heteronormative 
society and is not interested in a greater inclusion of LGBT people into the actual system of 
beliefs. Actually, their objective is to change fundamentally the traditional view of sexuality 
and to build a society where no restraint on sexuality would exist. Demand to access marriage, 
in their point of view, is associated with the desire to be part of a society that they in reality 
deny. On the other hand, the main part of the movement seeks to remove any barriers on 
sexual freedom, marriage being one of them
2
. As explained before, for this part of the LGBT 
movement, claiming access to marriage is purely a matter of equality of rights. 
Studies have demonstrated that social rights of the LGBT community expand generally more 
rapidly in “high-income democracies (the modernization hypothesis), where social movements 
are abundant, strong, organized, and sufficiently networked (the social movement hypothesis), 
and where religion is less influential in the daily life of majorities (the secularist or culturalist 
hypothesis)”3. Therefore, countries better fitting those criteria are supposed to be the first ones 
to grant same-sex unions of a legal recognition. 
Values of the country regarding traditional gender values are a significant aspect that will 
impact the decision of a country on whether formally recognizing same-sex unions. Indeed, 
homosexual couples embodied a fading of traditional gender relations, such as abortion and 
divorce
4
. Nonetheless, there have been cases where abortion has not been legalized before, or 
only shortly before, same-sex couples, such as in Argentina, Ireland, Mexico and Portugal
5
. 
The case of South Africa where polygamy – generally considered as gender regressive - and 
same-sex marriages have been legalized at the same time, is also considered as contradictory 
to the general principle
6
. 
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The literature has also demonstrated that the domestic acceptance of LGBT partnership 
depends on the legitimacy of international human rights norms in the nation’s view. Indeed, a 
crucial aspect of the LGBT movement is its international dimension. Such as other human 
rights activists before them, “LGBT groups have found transnational organizing and lobbying 
international organizations to be a highly successful way of promoting their cause”1. After 
all, the human rights framework already existed before the creation of the movement 
promoting sexual diversity. What is new about the movement is not the way they use to 
bolster their cause but rather, the claim that sexual orientation cannot be the cause of 
discrimination and that human rights should include the freedom of sexual orientation
2
. 
In reality, the pro-LGBT rights movement resorts to other features of globalization than just to 
the well-established system of human rights defense such as, national, international laws and, 
international organizations. The LGBT movement made their ideas traveled through 
transnational belts such as cultural productions or country foreign policies
3
. On the contrary 
of the traditional left in Latin America suspicious of globalization, the movement defending 
sexual diversity preferred to turn globalization into a booster for their claim. In fact, whereas 
the leftwing movement in Latin America is more a globalization basher, the LGBT movement 
is more a globalization user
4
. 
As a consequence of this globalized activism, following the norm emergence theory exposed 
in the sub-section “III.B.1 Norms”, LGBT activists can be described as norm entrepreneurs5, 
or as activists beyond border
6
. Besides, the literature
7
 has abundantly argued that the 
successes the movement has known globally can be understood as the first signs of an 
emerging international norm, indicating the LGBT cross-border influence, transnational 
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dynamic and capacity of norm diffusion. The increasing diversity of the countries discussing 
the topic confirms the global diffusion of the debate
1
. Nowadays, same-sex marriage became 
the only way to achieve equality for homosexual couples, even putting aside the simple legal 
recognition of same-sex couples. For opponents, this international normative pressure 
corresponds to cultural imperialism and proves that foreign states and supranational 
institutions interfere into domestic affairs
2
. Overall, the literature has demonstrated that the 
pro-LGBT rights movement has jointly used the human rights framework as well as the global 
system characterized, among others, by modern technologies, global mass media, and 
multilevel governance structures, to strengthen the influence of the transnational dynamic of 
the LGBT activism on national debates. 
Actors of this internationalization are mainly activists and experts but judges and politicians 
also played a crucial role in this global diffusion. National policies as well as laws and 
jurisprudence from other countries increasingly served as references for judges and 
politicians
3
. This has been the case of Argentina for example, whose law has been deeply 
influenced by the Spanish case
4
. Domestic actors track more and more worldwide models and 
as a consequence, if a state tends to adopt the global human rights model, it will probably 
introduce some kinds of same-sex couples’ legal protection5. 
In conclusion, whether a country will legally recognize homosexual relations depends on its 
perception of the legitimacy of international human rights values as well as, as already 
exposed previously, its level of income, its social movement importance and strength and 
finally, its religious and traditional gender values. 
IV.C.1. URUGUAY’S VISION 
Many authors
6
 recognized that since the moment the Frente Amplio rose to power in 2005, 
Uruguay made significant progresses in LGBT rights. For example, “in 2007, Uruguay 
became the first Latin American country to legalize civil unions”7. Uruguay enacted the Law 
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N° 18.246 which describes union of concubinage as “the de facto situation derived from the 
life in common of two persons—regardless of their sex, identity, orientation or sexual 
choice—who maintain a relationship of affection of a sexual nature, of exclusive, singular, 
stable and permanent temperament”1. This law allowed homosexual couples to benefit from 
similar rights as married couples in inheritance, pensions and child custody issues. Following 
this first step, Uruguay also passed the law in 2009 allowing same-sex couples in a civil union 
to adopt, being once more the leader in Latin America
2
. The same year, the Defense Minister 
signed a decree allowing gay people’s enrollment to the military service, putting an end to the 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. And finally, in 2009, Uruguay also legalized 
the change of the registered name and legal gender in the objective to strengthen the citizens’ 
rights of the transgender community. All those advances in LGBT rights made Uruguay the 
top country of the American continent in that respect, followed by Argentina, Brazil, 




It is not surprising therefore that in 2013, “Uruguay again made history, and broke with Latin 
American convention, by becoming the second Latin American country after neighboring 
Argentina to legalize same-sex marriage”4. The bill has been massively approved by the 
Chamber of Deputies in December 2012 and by the Senate in April 2013. After one year, the 
Law N° 19.075 allowed seventy same-sex couples to get married in Montevideo
5
.  
As for the abortion, the objective of the legalization of the same-sex marriage was to 
strengthen the rights of a considerable group of people, in that case, the LGBT community. 
But also, this law came as a help for same-sex couples to solve their legal dilemmas. In 
contrast to the decriminalization of the abortion, the consensus in the political system and the 
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IV.C.2. INFLUENCE ON THE LATIN AMERICA N DISCOURSE 
In Latin America, as in the rest of the world, one of the claims of the LGBT movement is the 
legal acknowledgement of same-sex couples
1
. Overall, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Nicaragua 
and Panama show rather low level of acceptance of sexual minorities
2
. Evidences of this 
behavior can be found for example in the article 63 of the Bolivian Constitution which states 
that “I. Marriage between a woman and a man is set by legal ties and is based on equal rights 
and duties of the spouses. II. Free unions that meet the requirements of stability and 
monogamy, and that are maintained between a woman and a man without legal impediment, 
produce the same effects as civil marriage, both in personal and property relations of the 
cohabitants and regarding daughters or son adopted or born from those”3. The Paraguayan 
Constitution of 1992 establishes also a very strict definition of marriage or unions, giving no 
legal space for same-sex marriage or unions
4
. The Constitution of Peru also defines marriage 
as the exclusive relationship between a man and a woman, and does not allow the possibility 
of marriages between same-sex couples. In Nicaragua and Panama, until 2008, homosexuality 
was still considered as a crime according to the Penal Code
5
. After 2008 however, “all 
Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America plus Brazil have completely decriminalized 
homosexuality”6. In the region, Guyana7 and Belize8, English speaking countries, however 
still consider homosexual acts as illegal. 
On the other hand, many other countries show high progresses in the protection of LGBT 
rights. Before any legalization of same-sex marriage, some countries or cities first recognized 
legally same-sex unions. This was the case of Buenos Aires (2003), Río Grande del Sur 
(2004), Uruguay (2007), Ecuador (2008), Colombia (2009)
9
 and since recently, Chile 
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. Nonetheless, Ecuadorian and Chilean same-sex couples are still prevented from the 
possibility of adoption
2
. In 2007, the MERCOSUR agreed on a document that aimed to get rid 
of any sexual orientation discrimination by, among others, calling for the legal recognition of 
same-sex unions or for the equal access to marriage for same-sex couples
3
. However, even if 
the civil registration of same-sex unions represented an obvious step forward in LGBT rights, 
it kept clear the distinction between homosexual and heterosexual couples who could get 
married. This distinction between civil unions and marriage was perpetuating the inequality 
and discrimination against same-sex couples
4
.  
Mexico Federal District is the first place in Latin America where gay couples could get 
married. The city, against the will of the federal government, started to issue marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples in 2009
5
. In 2010, Argentina became the first Latin American country to 
allow marriage between same-sex couples
6
. Actually, the case of Spain, the first catholic-
majority country legalizing same-sex marriage in 2005, had great influence across Latin-
America and mainly on Argentina who used the Spanish law for drafting their gay-marriage 
bill
7
. Argentina has been quickly followed by Uruguay, Brazil and several Mexican districts
8
 
and later on, by Colombia (2016)
9
. 
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 argues that successful experiences in Latin America demonstrated the crucial role of 
democratic institutions in the expansion of LGBT rights. First, the Latin American experience 
suggests that the relation between politicians and LGBT movements is beneficial for both 
parties. Indeed, social movements need political support to be effective and in a strongly 
competitive party system, being supportive of the LGBT’s causes may advantage a party. 
“The best examples of fruitful links between proLGBT movements and the moderate left are in 
Brazil and Uruguay”2. Second, federalism is another important democratic feature impacting 
the level of tolerance of homosexuals. On the one side, the risk with federalism is to give 
more power to subnational units which tend to be more conservative on gender aspects. On 
the other side, federalism provides space to subnational units to experiment and to increment 
changes. Via the example that subnational units may give, fear may decrease and a national 
positive reaction may arise. On the prospect, federalism can be useful for LGBT rights 
expansion, as it was in the case in Brazil. Finally, courts and judges have also been actors of 
the changes in the Latin American perception of the LGBT community. The interpretation of 
legal and constitutional dispositions of judges helped LGBT rights to progress. Activists of 
the movement, aware of the power of jurisprudence, successfully used judicialization as a 
strategy to address publicly their claim and to change the status quo
3
. Actually, unlike in the 
North Atlantic region where LGBT related laws followed changes in social tolerance, in Latin 
America, the legal system linked to LGBT rights have been transformed prior to public 
opinion. The consequences of this lag between societal tolerance and legal status are not yet 
clear but, the problem is that “despite impressive legal advances, Latin America continues to 
be the scene of startling incidents of public homophobia”4. 
Two factors explain why Latin America still shows some resistance to legalize same-sex 
couples. First and above all, the highly significant influence of the Catholic Church in the 
region prevents from further progress in sexual rights
5
. As explained before, the Catholic 
Church and its allies’ discourse argues that any formal recognition of same-sex unions puts in 
danger and weakens the marriage institution, essential for a sustainable social order. Second, 
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the hard leftist wave that hit the region recently, often dismissed LGBT rights for the 
following reasons: “hard-left movements privilege collective rights over individual rights; 
they prioritize economic equality over issues of sexual diversity; they are dominated by 
conservative machos who prioritize values other than fighting heteronormativity”1. Regarding 
countries or cities ruled by conservative groups such as in Buenos Aires, Chile and Columbia, 




As we can see, the level of acceptance of homosexual partnership differs highly between 
countries and in general, Central America shows a higher level of rejection of the LGBT 
community than South America where, already four countries, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, 
and Colombia legalized same-sex marriages. In some cases, this unevenness regarding LGBT 
rights is even present within a country itself. For instance, Brazil has strong legalization 
protecting LGBT individuals but the number of LGBT people murdered is still one of the 
highest in the world
3
. As exposed in the introduction of the section “IV.C. Same-sex 
marriage”, the variation of status of LGBT rights between countries has been explained by the 
literature through four aspects: the economic development, the importance and strength of 
social movements and specially, the LGBT movement, the religious and traditional gender 
values and finally, the legitimacy of international norms model for the country. In general, the 
differences in LGBT tolerance between countries in Latin American can be justified by one or 
more of those factors. However, exceptions exist: some of rather rich countries such as 
Venezuela or Trinidad and Tobago or some of fast-growing states such as Peru are one the 
most intolerant of LGBT population. Long history in social movements is not always neither 
synonym of progress in LGBT rights such as the case of Bolivia. Religious values are not 
always decisive in the determination of the level of protection of LGBT individual. For 
example, Argentina, a rather religious country, did overcome the Catholic Church leadership 
while countries such as Venezuela or Bolivia did not prevail on religious beliefs
4
. 
All in all, debates on sexual diversity escalated and LGBT activists increased the visibility of 
the demands in the public agenda of many countries of the region. “In general terms, it is 
possible to state that sexual diversity has achieved a greater level of acceptance on the part of 
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the citizens and greater awareness within the political society, which allows to presume a 
future expansion of rights”1. 
To which extend Uruguay could be considered as decisive in this change of discourse in Latin 
America? The following paragraphs will try to answer that question. First of all, it is 
important to acknowledge that the case of Argentina, as the first country in Latin America to 
legalize same-sex marriage, has been perceived from outside as “a serious blow to Latin 
America’s longstanding reputation as a bastion of machismo”2, even if, as we have explained 
previously, gay-rights revolution in the region was already turned on. The case of Argentina 
has indeed influenced its neighbor country, Brazil. In fact, Brazilian legislators, lawyers and 
activists considered that their Congress should pursue rules in lines with the approval in 
Argentina. Actually, the norm pressure from Argentina has resulted in Brazilian legalization. 
The following declaration of the Brazilian deputy José Genoino from the Workers Party 
illustrates this norm pressure: “Should it not follow the Argentine Congress, the Brazilian 
Congress may be accused to be conservative”3. Following this observation, it appears that 
Argentina, instead of Uruguay, is generally considered as the main leader of same-sex 
marriage in Latin America.  
However, even if Argentina happened to be the reference for same-sex marriage in Latin 
America, Uruguay’s stance still impacted to some extend the region. As for abortion, 
Uruguay’s action in regional organizations supported the norm spreading. For instance, 
Uruguay, along with Argentina, Colombia and United States, supported the resolution brought 
by Brazil at a meeting of the OAS in 2008 whose objective was to condemn all forms of 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity - SOGI discrimination. Through the adoption of the 
resolution called "Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity", the General 
Assembly of the OAS committed member states and the OAS itself to remove, where they 
exist, barriers that prevent "lesbians, gays and bisexuals, transgender and intersex people" 
from taking part in public life and in the political system
4
. The organization also took the 
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commitment to organize a special session to discuss how to apply Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights
1
 principles and standards related to matters of SOGI
2
. In 2014, 
following its actions against LGBT people discrimination, the General Assembly anew 
considered and approved the resolution condemning all forms of discrimination against 
people on the grounds of sexual orientation, but eleven countries
3
 did not join or expressed 
some reserves about the consensus
4
. For instance, Guatemala and Ecuador considered that 
“the absence of legal recognition of same-sex marriage does not constitute a discriminatory 
practice”5. Since the meeting of the General Assembly was in Asunción, it stressed the 
reactions in Paraguay and protests within the capital. For instance, “the Paraguayan 
Episcopal Conference, the Paraguayan Association of Evangelical Pastors, and the 
Paraguayan Association of Evangelical Churches openly opposed the OAS resolution. In 
addition, more than 47,000 people signed a petition on CitizenGo asking the OAS to protect 
itself from "the imposition from feminist and homosexual pressure groups"”6. Finally, the 
Paraguayan government took the decision not support the resolution
7
. 
The Uruguayan position on LGBT rights and same-sex marriages has also been promoted by 
Luis Almagro, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay during José Mujica’s 
presidency and actual Secretary General of the OAS. During his nomination speech as the 
Secretary General of the OAS
 8
, Luis Almagro reiterated the necessity of policies and 
programmes “to eliminate discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender”. He 
highlighted the duty of the OAS “to redouble efforts to recognize equal rights to all people 
and to encourage participation of everyone”. This speech shows how strong the Secretary 
General is determined to pursue OAS’s actions against discrimination on basis of sexual 
orientation. He actually continues to promote the gay-friendly policies that he and José 
Mujica’s government implemented in Uruguay.  
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Uruguay’s formal support to a decrease of LGBT individuals’ discrimination is not limited to 
Latin America but goes further. Uruguay has been for example active in recommendations 
and resolutions at the UN. Three years after the first resolution on SOGI issues, during the 
26
th
 session of the UN Human Rights Council in 2014, more than 500 NGO’s from around the 
world and many states, including Argentina delivering a statement on behalf of Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, México and Uruguay, expressed their willingness to see the UN acting another 
resolution on SOGI issues
1
. They communicated their concern about the continuity of actions 
taken by the Council on that matter. Shortly after, in September 2014, Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and Uruguay and 42 additional co-sponsors introduced at the UN human Rights Council the 
second resolution on SOGI. This is considered as an important step in the struggle against 
violence and discrimination based on SOGI
2
. Uruguay, jointly with other countries, also 
recommended different countries such as Kuwait and Kiribati, to decriminalize same-sex 
sexual relations during the Universal Periodic Review - UPR
3
 of the UN Human Rights 
Council in January 2015
4
. 
IV.C.3. CHANGES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN DISCOURSE? 
The revolution of LGBT rights in Latin American is definitely going on. Even if only four 
countries, namely Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Colombia, have legalized same-sex 
marriage, the LGBT community has seem their rights increased recently and debates over the 
issues are still taking place nowadays in various countries of the region.  
In the previous sub-section, it became clear that Argentina is generally considered as the 
leader of the region regarding same-sex marriage and that it became a model for other states 
in Latin America. The Uruguayan depute Sebastian Sabini, from the Frente Amplio, 
recognized that Argentina was a "a very important precedent because it helped much to open 
the debate in Uruguay”5. Nonetheless, we have demonstrated also that some of the following 
factors limit the leadership of Argentina. 
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First, Uruguay, not Argentina, has proved to be at the vanguard of LGBT rights. Indeed, even 
if Uruguay granted same-sex couples of the possibility to get married after Argentina, it was 
the first country to make a step forward in other aspects, such as civil unions and adoption. 
The vanguard position has been recognized by the annual 2015 Americas Quarterly Social 
Inclusion Index. Same-sex marriage is a crucial issue in the eyes of the LGBT people but we 
believe that the rights, such as adoption, are as important as homosexual marriage in the 
struggle for the remove of discrimination on basis of sexual orientation. On that aspect, it is 
clear that Uruguay’s LGBT related laws are an example for the region. The “VIII. B. Annex 
2. LGBT rights in Latin America and Caribbean” presents a map illustrating the leadership of 
Uruguay in terms of LGBT rights. 
Second, we have found no significant statements from other countries in reaction to the 
legalization of homosexual marriages in Uruguay. Actually, this is not surprising because 
Uruguay does not act alone but, is part of a leading group composed by Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and, sometimes Mexico, in the struggle for advances of LGBT rights. This informal 
group took repeatedly the foremost position in debates over LGBT issues, such as in the OAS 
resolution “Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity” and in the UN SOGI 
resolution. As a result, Uruguay, along with other similar countries, is responsible of the 
changes in the Latin American LGBT related discourse. In a transnational matter such as the 
LGBT rights, those countries are actually the norm entrepreneurs of the Latin American 
region. Future will tell if they manage to turn the LGBT cause into an internalized and fully 
accepted norm. For now, the norm is reaching the second stage of the norm life’s cycle, the 
norm cascade, since it is spreading to more conservative countries such as Chile. 
Finally, as the Secretary General of the OAS and former active minister of José Mujica’s 
government, it will be interesting to see to which extend Luis Almagro will be able to pursue 
and spread OAS’s action to decrease discrimination towards the LGBT community during his 
mandate. 
IV.D. CANNABIS 
Regarding drug policies, two approaches are possible: a country can decide to adopt the 
paradigm of harm reduction, or the paradigm of prohibition. Governments adopting the 
paradigm of harm reduction protect citizens from risk of drug consumption and addiction. 
Those states may legalize, to a certain degree, drug consumption considering that, their use is 
unavoidable, even when prohibiting them. By legalizing its consumption to some degree, the 
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states hope to be able to make drug consumption safer. The final objective of this paradigm is 




On the other hand, under the paradigm of prohibition, any drug consumption is considered as 
totally illegal. The presence of drug in the society is perceived as “problematic, unnecessary, 
and undesirable”2 and in order to decrease drug consumption, any action related to drug, such 
as consumption, possession, production, or sale, is totally banned
3
.  
Over all, drug policies can range from an extreme of total prohibitionism to another extreme 
of total harm reduction. This means that countries have three possibilities: total legalization, 
partial decriminalization or total prohibition
4
. Up to now, most of the countries were 
following the path of complete prohibition, observing the US-influenced International Drug 
Control Regime - IDCR
5
. The IDCR can be described as “the supranational system composed 
by several international agreements which regulate psychoactive drugs”6. It has been actively 
promoted by the United States, since the beginning of the twentieth century, and in particular 
since the UN creation
7
. The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is the first document 
framing the current drug control system. In addition to this document, came the 1971 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In sum, those three documents “criminalize the 
use and possession of controlled drugs, including cannabis, for uses other than medical and 
scientific purposes. They also strictly prohibit any domestic market in the substances”8. Those 
drugs treaties actually tied countries to observe a prohibitionist pattern.  
Nonetheless, the American leadership in drug control in Latin America is decreasing due to 
the following different reasons. First, some states of the United States have started to open up 
to cannabis decriminalization: even if cannabis consumption remains illegal under the federal 
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law, twenty-one states legalized its consumption for medical purposes and fourteen have 
decriminalized its possession since 1996
1
. This inconsistency in the American domestic drugs 
policy tarnished its moral authority. Second, since the terrorist attacks of 2001, priorities of 
the American foreign policy have moved from the war on drugs
2
 to the war on terrorism, 
what resulted in a diminished American presence in Latin America. Those two elements, the 




The next sub-section explains the vision of Uruguay on cannabis and more broadly, on drugs. 
Afterwards, we analyze how the drugs policy discourse recently changed in Latin America, 
focusing on the significance of Uruguay’s law and actions. The last sub-section is devoted to 
the most important results of Uruguay’s influence on the drug reforms in Latin America. 
IV.D.1. URUGUAY’S VISION 
In December 2013, Uruguay became the first country in the world where the state has the full 
control over the production, the distribution and the sale of cannabis
4
. Previously to the 
Law N° 19.172 fully legalizing cannabis, the cannabis regime in Uruguay was regulated by 
the Law N° 17.016 of 1998 which criminalized the production and the traffic, but not the 
personal consumption, of cannabis
5
. Cultivation of the plant as well as drug trafficking were 
already illegal since the Law N° 14.294 of 1974 but the Article 31 of this law stating that 
“individual possessing a minimum quantity solely for personal use will be exempt from 
penalty” gave no clear indication when consumption was illegal6. 
Prior to the legalization of cannabis, some calls for reforming the drug system have already 
been formulated
7
, including by the former President Jorge Battle Ibáñez in 2000
1
. Yet, in 
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2010 the congressman Luis Lacalle Pou is the first to call seriously for a change in the 
cannabis regulation. He made the proposal of self-farming cannabis plants, arguing that it 
would keep consumers away from the ones that “profit from the disease of others - the 
traffickers”2. His proposal did not receive much attention and even if it had, the project was 
not strong enough in the sense that it was not giving any solution to remove the ambiguity 
regarding the acceptable quantity of marijuana for personal consumption. Since then, other 




An important obstacle to the legalization of cannabis was the weak support from the 
population. In 2012, the consultancy firm CIFRA conducted a survey showing that 64 % of 
the Uruguayans disapproved the project of legalization of cannabis, 26 % supported it and 
10 % had no opinion
4
. Facing doubts from his own party
5
, but yet more from the opposition
6
, 
José Mujica publicly and actively defended and supported the project of the law, unlike for 
the abortion and same-sex marriage legalization
7
. 
Eventually, with the enactment of the Law N° 19.172, Uruguayans, over eighteen years old 
and registered at the regulating governmental agency Institute of Regulation and Control of 
Cannabis - IRCCA
8
, can obtain cannabis through three different ways. First, a registered 
citizen can self-produce up to six cannabis plants and up to 480 grams per year. Second, 
registered citizens can gather into cannabis clubs to grow their cannabis plants. Those clubs 
must be registered, have to be composed by fifteen up to forty-five members and, can grow up 
to ninety-nine plants without however, exceeding the supply limit of 480 grams per year, per 
member. Third, registered citizens can purchase up to forty grams per month of the state-
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The objective of this law is clearly articulated in the Article 4: “to protect the people of this 
country from the risks that illegal commerce and drug trafficking entail, seeking through state 
intervention to attack the devastating sanitary, social, and economic consequences of the use 
of psychoactive substances”2. As we can see, the objective of the law is double: reduction of 
violence and harm related to drug trafficking, and protection of the citizen from risky drug 
consumption. Up to now, the common behavior adopted by states around the world towards 
cannabis was the total prohibition of, at least, production and distribution. The paradigm of 
prohibition, in contrast to the paradigm of harm reduction, was globally implemented and 
supported worldwide
3
. Actually, in passing this law, Uruguay is adopting a new and 
innovative paradigm. Uruguay already expressed its willingness to review the actual global 
model in its Drugs Strategy for 2011-2015. Indeed, the country was ensuring in this document 
its desire to initiate “a great international debate about the implementation and the results of 
the hegemonic drug policies in force in the last 50 years, prompting the review of the 
international conventions governing the matter"
4
. In its view of drug control, Uruguay 
includes different aspects such as science, public health, social developments and human 
rights
5
. Indeed, the model promoted by Uruguay aims to reduce black market and at the same 
time, to increase the freedom of the individuals in their choices of consumption while 
strengthening awareness of health risks of cannabis consumption
6
. To reach that objective, 
Uruguay thought about two strategies. First, to reduce drugs trafficking, the government plans 
to offer state-grown cannabis for a competitive price of 1$ per gram
7
, with the hope that 
consumers will move away from the illegal market. Second, in order to protect the citizen 
from the damages of drug consumption or from violence linked to black market, the 
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government will invest the money collected from cannabis commercialization taxes in the 
enforcement of the law, treatment of drug addiction, education and prevention campaigns
1
. 
In the research of a better model, Uruguay presents itself as an ideal social laboratory. Asking 
for the support of the international community, José Mujica himself explained that the 
regulation of cannabis has to be perceived as a social experiment and “a contribution to 
humanity”2. The President explained that they “are on a path of an experiment. An experiment 
done with intellectual honesty, not to encourage the spread of an addiction, which is, like any 
addiction, a plague”. And in reality, as we have already explained for the case of abortion, the 
Uruguayan features, such as strong institutions, small size, homogeneity in population and, 
past liberal stance, turn the country into an excellent social laboratory
3
. Another element 
helping for this first experiment is the rather trivial role Uruguay plays in the regional narco-
trafficking. As Valdomir
4
 explains, the largest consumers markets are Argentina and Brazil, 
and the major producer of cannabis is Paraguay. The role of Uruguay lies more in the 
circulation and laundering of illegal drug-related money. 
In mid-2015, one year and nine months after the law has been signed by the President, about 
3 000 people were registered at the IRCCA as self-growers and seven clubs received their 
license to start growing cannabis. However, no state-grown cannabis has been sold and 
neither state-owned pharmacy has been opened yet
5
. Given the rather weak support to the 
cannabis legalization of the new President, it seems that the new government is slowing down 
the process of state-grown cannabis sale
6
. The government however argues that they do not 
want to rush into a system that needs reflection due to its complexity
7
. Since clubs and private 
growers cannot sell to the public, without the sale of state-grown cannabis, there are fears of 
growing robberies and of an increased black market. Indeed, the public cannabis sale through 
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pharmacies is a crucial point in the objective of reduction of illegal market
1
. In October 2015, 
the President of the Junta Nacional de Drogas, Juan Andrés Roballo, declared that the 
Uruguayan government finally gave the rights to two companies to start producing and 
distributing cannabis with the objective to open pharmacies eight months later, namely mid-
2016
2
. The Junta Nacional de Drogas reported in the sixth national survey on drug use in 
households
3
, conducted from August to December 2014 that, 9,3 % of the population 
consumed marijuana in the last 12 months, compared to 8,3 % in 2011. The study also noted 
that the biggest jumps in consumption occurred from 2001 to 2006, when this rate of 
consumption rose from 1,4 % to 5,5 %, and then to 2011 when it rose to 8,3 %. The Junta 
thus commented declaring that "the growth in consumption corresponds to the trend that 
began in 2001, indicating that the discussion on the regulation did not affect historical 
consumption patterns"
4
. Another survey, conducted among nine countries of the region, by 
the Latin American Observatory on Drug Policy and Public Opinion from Asuntos del Sur, 
estimated that, in the years 2014-2015, 11 % of Uruguayans has consumed cannabis in the last 
30 days, being in the regional mean and lower than Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and, 
Argentina
5
. Another aspect shown in the study is that the proportion of Uruguayans 
considering that the use of drugs should be an individual right (68 %) is the highest of the 
region and far above the regional mean (49 %)
6
. 
IV.D.2. INFLUENCE ON THE LATIN AMERICA N DISCOURSE 
In Latin America, cannabis law started to be more permissive even before Uruguay passed its 
law in 2013. In 1988, Paraguay passed a law to exempt from punishment the possession of ten 
grams of marijuana for personal consumption as well as, small quantities of hard drugs
7
. 
Since 1991 and the entering into force of the Law 108, Ecuador allows the possession of small 
amounts of cannabis and hard drugs. Yet, if the consumption is judged excessive or illegal, 
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the consumer is considered sick and has to be treated in accordance, what actually resulted in 
sentences disproportionate to the crimes and in violations of human and civil rights
1
. The 
Supreme Court of Argentina ruled in 2009 that it was unconstitutional to be punished for 
possession and consumption of small amounts of cannabis as long as it does not endanger 
others
2
. At the same time, Mexico also decriminalized possession of small quantities of 
cannabis (up to five grams), along with small amount of hard drugs
3
. Finally, in Colombia, yet 
a strongly prohibitive country, the Constitutional Court followed the trend in 2012 by 
enacting that individuals cannot be prosecuted for the possession of cannabis (less than twenty 
grams) and hard drugs for personal consumption
4
. In sum, before Uruguay passed its law in 
2013, cannabis was regulated as following in Latin America: 
Table 5: Legality of cannabis in Latin America
5
: 
Status of cannabis law Countries 
Criminalization Bolivia, , Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala 
Pending decriminalization Brazil and Ecuador 
Partially decriminalized Chile, Colombia, Venezuela and El Salvador 
Possession of small quantities fully 
decriminalized 
Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru and Mexico 
Many countries of Latin America welcomed the initiative of Uruguay to become the first 
country in the world to fully regulate cannabis. This was the case of Guatemala, for instance, 
where the President Pérez Molina praised Uruguay’s decision6 and indicated that the “are 
following closely the experience
7. Guatemala’s President was already active in promoting 
                                                 
1
 US Department of State, “Information for American Citizens Arrested and Imprisoned in Ecuador,” US 
Department of State, accessed April 12, 2016, http://photos.state.gov/libraries/quito/153436/ACS/imprisioned-
pamphlet.pdf. 
2
 Alexei Barrionuevo, “Argentine Court Decriminalizes Private Marijuana Use,” The New York Times, August 
25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/world/americas/26briefs-argentinaruling.html; Armenta, Metaal, 
and Jelsma, “A Breakthrought in the Making? Shifts in the Latin American Drug Policy Debate,” 8–9. 
3
 The Associated Press, “Mexico Legalizes Drug Possession,” The New York Times, August 21, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/world/americas/21mexico.html; Armenta, Metaal, and Jelsma, “A 
Breakthrought in the Making? Shifts in the Latin American Drug Policy Debate,” 11. 
4
 Tony Newman and Ethan Nadelmann, “Colombia to Decriminalize Small Amounts of Cocaine and Marijuana 
for Personal Use,” Drug Policy Alliance, June 29, 2012, http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2012/06/colombia-
decriminalize-small-amounts-cocaine-and-marijuana-personal-use. 
5
 Transnational Institute, “Drug Law Reform on the Map - Drug Law Reform in Latin America,” Transnational 
Institute, accessed April 12, 2016, http://www.druglawreform.info/en/country-information/drug-law-reform-on-
the-map. 
6
 Chiara Menguzzato, “Will Guatemala Really Explore Marijuana Legalization in 2015?,” TalkingDrugs, 
November 21, 2014, http://www.talkingdrugs.org/will-guatemala-really-explore-marijuana-legalization-in-2015. 
7
 Free translation from TeleSur, “Pérez Molina: Es Importante Nueva Estrategia Sobre Migración,” TeleSUR, 
November 15, 2014, http://www.telesurtv.net/news/Perez-Molina-Es-importante-nueva-estrategia-sobre-
migracion-20141115-0038.html. 
 Uruguay and norm advocacy  
83 
 
changes in drug policies and soon after Uruguay’s law, a National Commission for Drug 
Policy Reform has been established to study possibilities to follow Uruguay’s example1. 
Mexico has been also influenced by Uruguay’s experience2. In fact, in 2015, the Supreme 
Court of Mexico ruled “that growing, possessing and smoking marijuana for recreation is 
legal under the right to freedom”3. The current President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, yet 
opposed to legalization, attempts to open the debate on drugs because of the failure of the 
prohibitionist policies observable in the increase of drug consumption and production
4
. 
Besides, the mayor of Mexico Federal District, Miguel Ángel Mancera, a strong supporter of 




Colombia also has been inspired by the example of Uruguay in the discussion of other 
plausible paths in drug policies
6
. The view of Colombia on drug moved towards a more 
permissive approach, considering the issue as a health problem
7
. In 2015, the use of cannabis 
for medical purposes became legal in Colombia
8
. This measure was supported by
 Colombia’s 
President, Juan Manuel Santos, who declared: “This decree puts Colombia in the group of 
countries that are leading ( ... ) in the use of natural resources to fight disease”9. 
In 2012, those three countries, Guatemala, Mexico and, Colombia, called the UN to move 
forward in 2016 the next UNGASS on drugs, originally scheduled for 2019, due to the 
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necessity to reform the actual IDCR. The aim of this meeting was to review the current drug 
policies and to rethink the objectives established during the last UNGASS on drugs in 1998
1
.  
Other countries, yet not referring directly to Uruguay’s law, also reinforced this changing 
paradigm on drug policies by undertaking modifications of their policies. Indeed, in October 
2014, Chile approved a project law legalizing the medical use of cannabis. The country 
therefore started to grow its own cannabis for its pilot programme of medical marijuana
2
. In 
2015, the Chilean parliament approved the law that decriminalizes self-cultivation and 
recreational use of cannabis
3
. As far as Argentina is concerned, the former Director of the 
Secretary of the Programme for the Prevention of Drug Addiction and Fight against Drug 
Trafficking - SEDRONAR, Juan Carlos Molina, recognized that his country also needs a deep 
reflection and debate on the cannabis decriminalization
4
. Later on, Roberto Moro, the actual 
head of the SEDRONAR, reiterated this concern and declared that he agrees with Uruguay’s 
position "to put the focus on people, on what happens to them, and from there, from a public 
health vision, to develop strategies for the country and the region". For the Director of the 
SEDRONAR, the challenge is "to progress in generating public policies that reach people 
and not to leave them in a state of declamations in the international bodies”5. Jamaica also 
stepped into drugs reforms in 2015 when it decriminalized medicinal, sacramental and 
recreational use of cannabis. The bill launched at the same time the Cannabis Licensing 
Authority, a state organization responsible of the regulation and the attribution of the license 
necessary for the production, the distribution and the sale of marijuana. Finally, in 2014, 
Ecuador replaced the criminal offences section of the Law 108 by the Organic Criminal 
Procedures Code, opening the debate on a more permissive model for drug policy
6
. 
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The implementation of the legal framework of marijuana in Uruguay has also attracted 
attention from other region of the world, as illustrated by the meeting between a Health 
Committee of the German Parliament and the president of the Uruguayan Chamber of 
Deputies, Alejandro Sanchez, in Montevideo in 2015. The leader of the German delegation, 
Edgar Franke, expressed that the focus of the meeting was the Uruguayan health system and 
its drug policy, since "it is an important issue for Germany". Indeed, they are presently 
studying the use of cannabis for clinical treatments of pain. In that regard, he stressed that 
Europe is looking "very closely to the path taken by Uruguay" in that matter
1
. 
Without any doubts, many countries of the region joined Uruguay in the drug reforms. Yet, 
even if Uruguay created a domino effect around itself, some strong critics regarding 
Uruguay’s law have been formulated by countries of the region. The geographically closed 
countries, Argentina and Brazil coming first, expressed their concerns about the cross-border 
spillovers of this legalization
2
. Before the law has been passed, an official Brazilian 
delegation, headed by the federal deputy Osmar Terra, even went to visit the Uruguayan 
health commission with the aim to dissuade them to pass the law
3
. According to the federal 
deputy’s words, the risk is that Brazilian borders cities become a gateway for illegal cannabis 
to enter the country from Uruguay
4
. What can also explain this strong reaction is the Brazilian 
drug position, who “has not shown any signs yet of softening its prohibitionist and punitive 
model”5. On that topic, the former president of the Chamber of Deputies of Brazil stated: “I 
do not think it [legalization of marijuana] will occur. It is a strongly rejected and under 
distortion issue for now”6. The cross-border consequences also worried Paraguay, the largest 
producer of marijuana in the region, whose head of Anti-Drug Secretariat, Luis Rojas, 
explained that the Uruguayan law may result in higher cannabis consumption in Uruguay and 
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consequently, it may increase the demand for Paraguayan cheaper cannabis
1
. He argued that 
they “are more than convinced it is going to stimulate internal consumption and thus the 
trafficking of marijuana towards there"
2
. For the President of Paraguay, Horacio Cartes the 
legalization of cannabis is “a utopia. The drug traffic situation will not change with the 
legalization of a drug”3 he said. However, the two countries, Uruguay and Paraguay, showed 
some signs of cooperation in the field of drug policy by reactivating in 2014, the Paraguay - 
Uruguay Joint Commission on Drugs, after being inoperable for thirteen years
4
. Finally, the 
former Mexican chancellor, José Antonio Meade, criticized the fact that Uruguay did not look 
for a regional consensus but, took a unilateral decision for a transnational issue
5
. He argued 




Public opinion of the region also differs regarding their reaction on the Uruguayan 
legalization of cannabis. A recent study, conducted by the Latin American Observatory on 
Drug Policy and Public Opinion from Asuntos del Sur
7
, showed that, among six countries 
studied, “Argentineans, Chileans and Mexicans are the ones who support the most the 
legalization driven in Uruguay”, the share of the supportive population being respectively 
59 %, 41 % and 32 %. Meanwhile, 69 %, 56 % and 44 % of the population of respectively El 
Salvador, Bolivia and Colombia reject the policy of Uruguay. The same study also 
demonstrated a relation between public opinion on matters such as legalization of cannabis, 
same-sex marriage, homosexuality and abortion. In fact, all the countries showing supportive 




Moreover, along with countries of Latin America, regional organizations have been 
influenced by Uruguay’s law and/or have participated into the change of drug policy 
paradigm. The OAS drug policy report issued in May 2013 demonstrated, for instance, that 
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the OAS works in the same line as Uruguay on the issue of drug
1
. Uruguay actually 
considered that report as a support for their bill in project, given that the report was asking 
states to experience new approaches perceiving drug as a health and human rights issue
2
. 
Besides, as other important regional organizations echoed the OAS report, another 
consequence of this report was the normalization of the need for national debate on the drug 
issue
3
. The UN Development Programme described the study of the OAS as “a milestone in 
the debate on the current approach” and argued that “it became an obligatory reference for 
any debate on drugs”4. In this context, it is important to highlight the unanimous adoption of 
the OAS General Assembly of the draft resolution on "Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights in the Search for New Approaches and Effective Solutions to the World Drug Problem 
in the Americas" in June 2014. The resolution was promoted by Uruguay and co-sponsored by 
Argentina. Through this resolution, the OAS committed itself “in the search for effective 
solutions to the world drug problem, […] with full respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms that incorporates public health, education, and social inclusion”5. 
The UNASUR is another regional organization who approved actively Uruguay’s decision 
and encouraged the dialogue and exchanges of experiences within the UNASUR
6
. Its 
Secretary General, Ernesto Samper, declared that “a policy review of the drug issue in a 
continent that, is perhaps the strongest hit by the problem, could be a good initiative to 
strengthen a space for discussion and for political exchanges in the UNASUR [and] could 
make an effective contribution to reduce the problem to its faire proportions”7. Regarding the 
drug reforms happening in the region, the UNASUR is indeed not standing outside. It put a 
foot into the debate with the creation of the South American Council on the World Drug 
Problem - CSPMD in 2009
8
. In July 2014, this Council agreed on a project to establish a Drug 
Observatories Network of States Member of the UNASUR in order to have a regional 
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perspective of the problem
1
. In February 2015, the Junta Nacional de Drogas of Uruguay and 
the UNASUR signed a letter according to which the Junta will be in charge of the project 
implementation, with the funding from the "Common Fund initiatives" of the UNASUR
2
. In 
August 2015, the CSPMD met in Montevideo and agreed on the document called “Common 
Vision of the CSPMD of UNASUR - UNGASS 2016", which proposes an approach in 
addressing the global problem of drugs with a human rights view. This approach has been 
submitted to the UNGASS on drug in April 2016
3
. In February 2016, the CSPMD met also in 
Montevideo to prepare the prospects of the new action plan on global drug problem that 
Venezuela will have to develop when assuming, after Uruguay, the pro-tempore presidency of 
the UNASUR
4
. During that meeting, countries of the region reiterated their priorities to search 
solutions for the drug problem and observed the progress of the Uruguayan experience 
regarding cannabis
5
. Overall, all those meetings have been highly influenced by the 
Uruguayan idea on drug policy thanks to, among others, the presence of representatives of the 
Junta Nacional de Drogas. 
The MERCOSUR also took part in the drug policy debate when in November 2014, following 
the proposition of the Paraguayan Ricardo Canese, its parliament discussed how to reduce 
harm and risks related to drug consumption
6
. As the UNASUR did, the MERCOSUR also set 
up a document, the declaration of Brasilia of 2015, through which the member states 
committed to intensify the exchange of ideas in order to progress in the establishment of 
common points for the UNGASS 2016. The document reinforced the importance of the public 
health, social inclusion and respect for human rights in formulating drug policy and at the 
same time, acknowledged the importance to respect the divergences between national 
approaches. The Secretary General of the Junta Nacional de Drogas of Uruguay, Milton 
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Romani, declared: “Somehow, it is a recognition of the comprehensive policies carried out by 
Uruguay including this type of market regulation”1. 
Finally, the CELAC also took the same direction as the two previous organizations, the 
UNASUR and the MERCOSUR, when it observed in Quito in 2015 the necessity to establish 
a common vision for the UNGASS 2016. The document of Quito highlights the same human 
rights and health approaches to the drug issue
2
. The member states of the CELAC finally 
ratified their common vision, without yet eliminating national differences, through the 
declaration of Santo Domingo of 2016, reaffirming the Declaration of Quito
3
. 
Around the world, Uruguay’s regulation of cannabis has provoked strong reactions. Drug 
reforms advocates usually welcomed the measure but, some concerns related to the state 
control have also been expressed. Indeed, “given privacy concerns, questions remain 
regarding the willingness of those who grow at-home or seek to acquire cannabis by 
registering with the government”4. 
Moreover, the IDCR embodied by the INCB and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime accused 
Uruguay to challenge the UN conventions on drugs
5
. Uruguay, as a signatory to all three 
Conventions forming the IDCR mentioned in the introduction of the section “IV.D. 
Cannabis”, was technically violating its commitment when it passed its law on cannabis in 
2013
6
. In 2010, the INCB already criticized the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 
and certain American states for “the growing movement to decriminalize the possession of 
controlled drugs [which has to be] resolutely countered”7. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the President of the INCB, Raymond Yans, accused the Uruguayan government of adopting a 
“pirate attitude” about the UN conventions8. As a response, Uruguayan Officials argued that 
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the law was in line with fundamental international human rights treaty obligations, what 
supplants drug control regime. Any ambiguity between those two elements is a matter that the 
international community has to solve
1
. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime, without any 
surprise, supported Raymond Yans’ statement2 and its Executive Director, Yuri Fedotov, 
added that “it is unfortunate that, at a time when the world is engaged in an ongoing 
discussion on the world drug problem, a unilateral action has been taken ahead of the 
outcome at a special session of the UN General Assembly planned for 2016”3.  
IV.D.3. CHANGES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN DISCOURSE? 
In the two previous sub-sections, we have observed the Uruguay’s stance on cannabis and 
drug policies and its influence on the Latin American discourse. What are the conclusions that 
can be taken out of this presentation? 
Undoubtedly, “Uruguay has quickly positioned itself in the vanguard of cannabis research”4. 
As Pien Metaal from the Transnational Institute of Amsterdam emphasized, “Uruguay has 
inspired many countries to at least take a few steps in that direction. It is not possible to go 
back. The genie came out of the bottle and there is no way to get him back inside”5. However, 
the innovative paths that Uruguay have opened are still under construction given that, the 
country has still not implemented all the components of its programme, and above all, the 
most controversial measure which is the sale of state-grown cannabis. In anyway, Uruguay 
can be considered as a launcher of a debate on alternative movements to get away from the 
outdated prohibitionist model posed by the war on drugs
6
. 
Uruguay not only launched a debate on drug policy in Latin America but also brought 
together the countries of the region, yet known to be divided ideologically. Indeed, several 
important regional organizations such as the OAS, the UNASUR, the MERCOSUR and the 
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CELAC worked on a common vision to defend and to present at the UNGASS 2016
1
. Having 
been able to gather the opinions from Michelle Bachelet’s and José Mujica’s leftist 
governments to Santos’ and Molina’s conservative ones is a significant aspect of the leading 
role of Uruguay. This also shows that the consensus over the new paradigm on drug policies 
is rather strong in Latin America
2
. As the Uruguayan OAS Ambassador, Milton Romani, said, 
“a Latin American profile in the search for alternative strategies to overcome the ‘war on 
drugs’ approach”3 has been achieved. 
However, even if a consensus on drug policy seems to have been reached in Latin America, 
some countries have shown some negative reactions to Uruguay’s law. We have mainly 
observed that there was a fear of cross-border consequences for the other countries. This can 
be associated to the concern of a unilateral decision for a transnational problem. A regional 
and common decision would have been more appropriated to face a transnational problem 
such as drug. Nonetheless, it would be naïve to think that all the countries of the region would 
jump both feet in the legalization of marijuana. Uruguayan experience is still too young for a 
possible assessment of its benefits and drawbacks. Besides, as already explained before, the 
specific features of Uruguay makes it perfect for social experiences. This is not the case of 
other countries of Latin America which would face much stronger difficulties in adopting new 
approaches in drug policy. Therefore, even if countries around the region show strong interest 
in Uruguay’s experiment, they show some reluctance to take similar action and prefer to adopt 
a “wait and see approach”4. 
The new paradigm launched by Uruguay’s initiative challenges the actual IDCR in the sense 
that it moves away from the prohibitionist paradigm and gets closer to the harm reduction 
paradigm. The most important point of this paradigm is considering drug as a health and 
human rights issue. The question is whether the new paradigm can be adopted worldwide and 
how international treaties should change to make it possible. For Robin Room, a member of 
the World Health Organization’s expert advisory panel on alcohol and drugs and a professor 
at Stockholm University’s Centre for Social Research on Alcohol and Drugs, it will be rather 
complicated to change the actual treaties to fit the changes in Latin America and in the United 
States: “The EU countries are not likely to do something that contravenes a treaty, especially 
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with the Ukraine crisis. The political system is stuck. The change from the US is coming from 
below [not federal government], and politicians are reluctant to be the first mover”1.  
Another important fact of the new paradigm is that it is challenging the American leadership 
in the IDCR
2
. In the introduction, we have already seen two factors, namely the loss of 
credibility and the decreased presence in Latin America, explaining why the influence of the 
United States on the drug control regime in Latin America was decreasing. After the 
development of the changes in the Latin American discourse on drug, there is no doubt that 
there is a change in leadership. The failure of the American war on drugs pushed Latin 
American leaders to search for their own solution
3
. The Colombian President, Juan Manuel 
Santos, expressed this growing awareness of responsibility when he said: “it is our duty to 
determine - on an objective scientific basis - if we are doing the best we can or if there are 
better options to combat this scourge”4. Given developments regarding cannabis legalization 
in the United States, “U.S. federal government is in a very awkward position to come down 
hard on a country like Uruguay [and] is going to be in a weak position to pressure other 
countries”5, as declared by John Walsh of the Washington Office on Latin America. And 
indeed, the relationship between Uruguay and the United States has not been negatively 
affected at all
6
, even if the United States has been promoting the prohibitionist paradigm for a 
long time
7




The UNGASS has recently been closed and actually marked changes in the drug policy 
paradigm. For Uruguay, and more broadly for Latin America, the UNGASS 2016 was an 
opportunity not to be missed. During the UN meeting, it appeared that the world is divided 
into two groups of countries, the ones that gave up on the war on drugs, leaded by Latin 
America, and the ones that are frontally opposed to leave behind those policies, such as 
Russia, China, and Asian Muslim countries. That division is primarily what prevented the UN 
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to take more ambitious steps towards reforms of the IDCR. Latin America, the region that 
suffered the most from drug-trafficking, emerged as the clearest voice for a new era in the 
global anti-drug strategies, centered on human rights and public health issues. For Milton 
Romani, the Secretary General of the Junta Nacional de Drogas, the idea to reevaluate the 
paradigm of the war on drugs has gained strength in several countries in the recent years and 
Uruguay has played a leading role in the bloc of countries that are demanding a change of 
approach
1
. "If we have applied a recipe based primarily on repression for so long without 
solving the problem, it is time to rethink the treatment"
2
 summarized the Colombian President 
Juan Manuel Santos in his speech at the UNGASS 2016. This idea is shared by the former 
Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, who believes “that drugs have destroyed many 
lives, but wrong government policies have destroyed many more”3.  
From the Uruguayan side, the UN approved document during the UNGASS 2016 is 
considered as a "step forward" in the drug paradigm shift, although it is still "insufficient", 
according to Milton Romani. He said: “the current control regime, based on a rigid ban 
seems to have been insufficient, confused, contradictory, when not harmful to achieve its final 
goals. States are expected to comply with the conventions. It is also expected that these are 
clear, precise and consistent"
4
. Uruguay also criticized that the moratorium on the death 
penalty or consideration of the decriminalization of consumption are not included in the UN 
document, even if the country considers it as positive in general
5
.  
During the meeting, Uruguay reaffirmed its focus on human rights in the drug policy problem. 
For Juan Pablo Pio, member of the official Uruguayan delegation to the UNGASS, "to speak 
about human rights in the UNGASS is, partly, to come back to the origin". He added that any 
implementation of drug policy that violates human rights goes against the spirit of the 
international conventions. Pio said that "we have countries that accompany our position" and 
that a common denominator, the human rights perspective, has been observed in the speeches 
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of the Presidents of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia
1
. Milton Romani concluded that Uruguay 
believes "that the document is a step forward because, for the first time, it incorporates the 
mention to human rights is incorporated and it focuses on preserving public health"
2
. 
All in all, the implications of the Uruguayan regulation of cannabis were the opening of 
regional debate on domestic drug policies, a uniting effect for Latin America on the drug 
control policies, and a launch of a new and alternative paradigm challenging the actual IDCR 
and the US leadership. All these elements tend to point that norms on drug regulation reached 
a tipping point in the debate. 
IV.E.  CONSEQUENCES ON THE REGIONAL ROLE OF URUGUAY 
During the previous sections, it appeared clear that Uruguay launched and contributed to the 
progress of crucial debates in Latin America. Uruguay leaded the region in terms of 
fundamental reforms in controversial issues. Let us review quickly what we have observed 
regarding the influence of Uruguay on the Latin American discourse concerning abortion, 
same-sex marriage and cannabis. 
Regarding abortion, our main observation is that Uruguay did not influence directly the 
countries of the region but indirectly, through its actions within significant regional 
organizations. Moreover, the impact of the Uruguayan law on VIP was much lower than the 
influence of the model “Changing relationships in the health care context: the Uruguayan 
model for reducing the risk and harm of unsafe abortions”. Uruguay’s expertise in developing 
strategies to diminish risky abortions has been regionally recognized and this gave Uruguay 
legitimacy in leading shifts in the abortion paradigm, moving slowly away from the 
prohibitive Catholic Church moral towards a more liberalist and feminist tolerant discourse. 
However, more than the feminist and liberalist arguments calling for the women’s rights to 
decide over their body, Uruguay’s vision highlights the necessity to face health issues related 
to clandestine abortions. Uruguay, as José Mujica expressed, sees abortion as "the most 
rational method to save the biggest number of lives"
3
. 
The gay revolution is clearly happening in Latin America and we found that Uruguay, along 
with Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and to some extent, Chile and Mexico, are walking ahead. 
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Regarding LGBT’s rights in general, Uruguay appeared to be at the vanguard, since it was the 
first country to grant them rights such as, the legal recognition of homosexual unions or 
adoption. About same-sex marriage in particular, Uruguay is actually sharing the leadership 
with Argentina, Brazil, and to some degree Colombia. Nevertheless, those countries have 
been working together in the promotion of a more tolerant society towards the LGBT 
community. The leading countries have put aside the restrictive vision of the Catholic Church 
to offer instead a less discriminating legal system. Indeed, we have seen that the main 
argument supporting same-sex marriage is the removal of discrimination that lies into the 
exclusive legal recognition of heterosexual unions. Uruguay shares this opinion and is 
promoting it in the region, along with likeminded states.  
Finally, regarding drug policies and in particular the regulation of cannabis, Uruguay is 
leading a shift towards a less prohibitive paradigm, searching for solutions to a failed 
American war on drugs. The whole region of Latin America is united behind the conviction 
that states’ approach to drug issues up to now has been inefficient and sometimes, even 
worsened the problem. Nowadays, the region focuses on putting human rights and health 
issues at the center of the drug debate and for that reason, calls for alternative paths to the 
actual IDCR. Uruguay, being the first to actually implement an alternative model that 
challenges the actual IDCR, gained legitimacy in the eyes of the other regional countries for 
representing and supporting the regional vision. Even if all the countries of the region are not 
supporters of legalizing drugs, they recognized in Uruguay the search for solutions to their 
common drug problem. The UNGASS 2016 demonstrated that a less prohibitive norm in the 
drug regulation debate has reached a tipping point but that countries, such as, Russia, China, 
and Asian Muslim countries, still show high resistance to move away from the prohibitive 
paradigm.  
All in all, Uruguay is a regional norm entrepreneur. In the section “III.B. Small States 
Normative Power”, we have established the definition that the literature gave for the concept 
of norm advocacy and norm life’s cycle. Let us go back to that literature and show how 
Uruguay fits the definition of norm entrepreneur for the region of Latin America.  
First, we have recognized the importance of platforms and structures in the norm advocacy 
process engaged by Uruguay. In all the situations, Uruguay strongly used crucial regional 
organizations to spread its vision. Actually, regional organizations were not only a tool to 
spread a message but they were active supporter of Uruguay’s vision. The case of Uruguay as 
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a norm entrepreneur confirms the hypothesis of the literature according to which, the actors of 
the norm emergence are a country called norm entrepreneur and organizational platforms.  
Second, the literature established that a norm promoter finds its motivation in altruism, 
empathy, ideational and/or commitment. For Uruguay, it seems that the ideational factor was 
the main motivation in promoting norm for more permissive abortion, same-sex marriage and 
legal cannabis. As José Mujica declared in an interview, Uruguay applied “a simple principle: 
to recognize the facts. Abortion is as old as the world. Gay marriage, please, is older than the 
world”. About the regulation of cannabis, José Mujica said “it is a tool to fight serious crime, 
drug trafficking, and to protect society. It is very serious”1. For José Mujica, who leaded 
Uruguay into the three polemical norms, the steps taken by the country respect a principle, the 
recognition of already existing situations. Uruguay overall promoted its laws by arguing that 
the actual situation is intolerable because it provokes discrimination, violation of human rights 
and, health issues. Taking note of those problematical and risky situations, Uruguay proposed 
solutions fitting national ideology of respect of human rights.    
Third, states have at their disposal four paths to advocate norms: framing, agenda-setting, 
diplomatic tactics and the power of the chair. First, the case of Uruguay seems to perfectly fit 
the framing method since the country provided “an interpretation of a particular problem, 
suggest a general line of appropriate action for ameliorating that problem, and assign 
responsibility for carrying out actions to address the problem at hand”2. In Latin America, 
clandestine abortion clinics, discrimination towards the LGBT community, and drug-
trafficking are clearly recognized as problematical situations and harmful for citizens. 
Regarding those acknowledged issues, Uruguay suggested solutions and hold a discourse 
looking for solutions. Second, Uruguay also used the tactics of agenda-setting in bringing 
actively hot issues at the front of regional discussion. Through an active participation in 
regional conferences or meetings of organizations, Uruguay put forwards the topic it was 
concerned about. In the third place, our way to analyze regional influence of Uruguay spotted 
no concrete sign of diplomatic tactics. Another method may acknowledge some forms of 
diplomatic strategy used by Uruguay but in our research, this is not the case. Finally, Uruguay 
used in few situations the power of the chair when, for instance, the Professor Briozzo was 
                                                 
1
 Free translation from El Liberal, “Pepe Mujica: La Legalización de La Marihuana, El Aborto Y El Matrimonio 
Gay Es Reconocer La Realidad,” El Liberal, March 10, 2014, http://www.elliberal.com.ar/noticia/128335/pepe-
mujica-legalizacion-marihuana-aborto-matrimonio-gay-reconocer-realidad. 
2
 Björkdahl, “Norm Advocacy,” 139–140. 
 Uruguay and norm advocacy  
97 
 
chairing the First Regional Conference on Population and Development in Montevideo in 
2013. 
Fourth, the academic literature hypothesized that the embracement of this emerging norm 
depends on how it fits the existing normative context and on how it competes with other 
interests. In the case of Uruguay, on the one side, the specific features of the country such as 
the smallness, cultural homogeneity, secularization and liberal stance turn the country into a 
perfect social laboratory. Therefore, the paths taken by the country are perceived by the rest of 
region more as an inspiration than a model to imitate. Indeed, Latin American countries face 
very different and complex situations that sometimes may prevent them to simply take 
Uruguay’s solution and replicate them domestically. Besides, in the case of abortion and drug 
policy, countries preferred to adopt a wait-and-see approach before thinking to follow 
Uruguay’s example. Indeed, those laws and models are still recent and more time is needed to 
be able to observe their pro and cons. Time will show how the model developed by Uruguay 
are actually solving the issues the region is facing.  
On the other hand, Uruguay has developed a normative pressure in Latin America or at least, 
has opened and eased debates. As Cristóbal Bellolio, an academic at Santiago’s Adolfo Ibáñez 
University, declared, “the Uruguay ruling helps. Uruguay legalizing abortion or Argentina 
granting same-sex marriages are solid international examples that show that in Chile we’re 
not mad if we want to approve divorce, gay marriage, or abortion. What we’re doing is 
basically following a universal tendency [in legalizing liberal policies] that, far from 
destroying society, does exactly the opposite”1. The Chilean academician put the focus on the 
paths that Uruguay has opened for other countries. Veronica Pérez, a political scientist at 
Montevideo’s University of the Republic, goes in the same direction when she explains that 
“experience has shown us that legislation tends to happen with one country following 
another. If you look at sexual equality laws in Latin America, they’ve tended to advance in 
waves, too, with countries copying each other”2. Uruguay played a crucial role in the opening 
of regional debate on abortion, same-sex marriage and cannabis regulation.  
Finally, and more importantly, the literature argues that through norm advocacy, a Small State 
can overweight its size in international debates. We have already established the role that 
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Uruguay played in three specific debates on abortion, same-sex marriage and cannabis 
regulation. As Turner wrote, “like Chile, highly literate and prosperous Uruguay has made 
cultural contributions far out of proportion to its small size”1. But what are the consequences 
of this increased influence for the country? And in particular, how this increased influence 
impacts the role of Uruguay in the region? In the following paragraphs, we confirm our 
hypothesis according to which Uruguay increased significantly its regional role thanks to 
norms advocacy.  
First, Uruguay increased significantly its role in the whole American continent when Luis 
Almagro, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay under José Mujica’s presidency, has 
been elected as the Secretary General of the OAS for five years (2015-2020). He replaced the 
Chilean diplomat José Miguel Insulza who held this position from 2005 to 2015. Uruguay had 
only once commanded the OAS in 1956 with the election of Jose Mora Otero
2
. Luis Almagro 
was the only final candidate but was formerly running against the Peruvian Diego García-
Sayán and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala, Eduardo Stein. The former 
withdrew due to a perceived lack of support from his government; the later, due to health 
reasons. Nonetheless, prior to withdrawing his candidacy, Eduardo Stein was receiving the 
backing of countries such as Honduras, Panama and the Dominican Republic. As far as Luis 
Almagro was concerned, he was supported by South American nations, including Colombia. 
The election of an active member of José Mujica’s government at the head of the OAS 
indicates two main elements: 
- The declining American influence over Latin America 
During his mandate of minister, Luis Almagro worked actively for the development of 
the UNASUR and CELAC, two organizations promoting regional integration and 
independence from the American cupola. As the Co-Director of the Center for 
Economic and Policy Research, Mark Weisbrot, explained “the U.S. would certainly 
prefer to have a Secretary General who would do what it wanted and apply a double 
standard on human rights in accordance with U.S. policy – as Stein had signaled he 
might do. Almagro’s election represents instead a triumph for regional integration 
and solidarity that opposes U.S. efforts to isolate particular countries”3. Besides, Luis 
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Almagro affirmed his hope that “a further step would be taken to include Cuba in the 
Inter-American system”1. In 1962, in the context of the cold war, the OAS took a 
resolution to exclude the government of Cuba out of the Inter-American system. This 
resolution has been resolved in 2009, but Cuba showed no sign of willingness to 
reintegrate the organization and declared that they “will not return to the OAS”, 
accusing the organization to be still "controlled by the United States” and that is 
"incompatible with the most vital desires of the peoples of Latin America"
2
. Luis 
Almagro’s desire to reintegrate Cuba illustrates how the American influence within 
the organization decreased slightly through his election.  
- The increased influence of Uruguay 
“I was sure that the principles and values we work together are the ones who the OAS 
needs”3 communicated José Mujica to Luis Almagro when he got elected. This 
actually illustrates the influence that Uruguay gained through the nomination of their 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Besides, Luis Almagro formed a team with allies 
coming from José Mujica’s government. Four Uruguayans that have worked in José 
Mujica’s administration entered in function in Luis Almagro’s secretariat: the former 
Secretary of the Presidency, Diego Canepa, the former undersecretary of Economy 
and vice Chancellor, Luis Porto, the former undersecretary of Public Health, Leonel 
Briozzo, and the former Minister of Defense, Luis Rosadilla
4
. The influence of 
Uruguayan former government on the OAS is thus undeniable.  
Second, Uruguay was at the head of the UNASUR during the year 2015. This happened so 
because the pro-tempore Presidency of the UNASUR is held successively by each of the 
member states, in alphabetical order, for annual periods
5
. Venezuela recently succeeded to 
Uruguay at the representative position of the UNASUR
6
. 
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Third, another important position held by Uruguay during the first semester of 2016 was the 
rotating role of presidency of the MERCOSUR. Undoubtedly, the main challenge for 
Uruguay was to handle negotiations to close a FTA between the EU and the MERCOSUR, an 
agreement “in struggle for 15 years” as José Mujica said1. The negotiations resumed in 2010, 
after a six-year suspension following the unsuccessful exchange of proposition in 2004. The 
very first steps regarding the negotiations occurred in 1999
2
. No agreement have been reached 
during Uruguay’s presidency but nonetheless, both parties agreed that “the second week of 
May, adjusting some logistical details, we will make the exchange of offers"
3
, as declared by 
the actual Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rodolfo Nin Novoa.  
Since the presidency of the UNASUR and MERCOSUR are rotating position, the presidency 
of Uruguay only show to limited extend the increased trust the country received from the 
region, following its increased normative power. Uruguay has been accepted, not chose, as a 
president for those two significant regional organizations. Besides, MERCOSUR focuses on 
economical, not political, aspects. Given that our research analyzes political, not economical, 
regional influence of Uruguay, the presidency of MERCOSUR supports to small extent our 
hypothesis that Uruguay increased its role in the region.  
Nonetheless, leading three regional organizations nearly simultaneously gave Uruguay a 
much louder voice. This is presently the case, for instance, during the problematic situation in 
Brazil. In the impeachment process against the Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff of 2015-
2016, Uruguay’s positioned itself as supporting the President. Dilma Rousseff is facing 
charges of allegedly manipulation of government accounts
4
. The ruling party of Uruguay, the 
Frente Amplio, expressed its support to Dilma Rousseff by denouncing a media campaign 
against her and condemning what is perceived as "institutional destabilization attempts". In 
this communicate, the Frente Amplio accuses a "strong campaign through powerful media" 
firstly, to have worked to avoid her re-election and secondly, to endanger "her continuity in 
                                                 
1




 Montevideo Portal, “Se Plantaron,” Montevideo Portal, April 11, 2016, 
http://www.montevideo.com.uy/auc.aspx?304964. 
3
 Montevideo Portal, “Para Mayo,” Montevideo Portal, April 8, 2016, 
http://www.montevideo.com.uy/auc.aspx?304646. 
4
 BBC News, “Could Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff Be Impeached?,” BBC News, April 17, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36028117; Simon Romero and Vinod Sreeharsha, “Dilma 
Rousseff Targeted in Brazil by Lawmakers Facing Scandals of Their Own,” The New York Times, April 14, 
2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/world/americas/dilma-rousseff-targeted-in-brazil-by-lawmakers-
facing-graft-cases-of-their-own.html. 





. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rodolfo Nin Novoa, explained that it has been 
decided that the Uruguayan President, “in his capacity of president of the UNASUR, issues a 
statement which, is already circulating in all countries, and a call for the respect of 
institutional order in Brazil, of the mandate of President Dilma Rousseff who has been elected 
by people will until 2019 and to make a call for the resolution of the situation as quickly as 
possible”2. The statement that Uruguay promoted among the countries of the UNASUR aims 
to give an explicit support to the Brazilian President. The document is being analyzed by the 
governments of the bloc and it will probably still take a few more days for an official 
statement to come
3
. As far as the OAS is concerned, Luis Almagro already expressed 
explicitly its support to Dilma Rousseff, considering that there is "no basis" for the opening of 
a political trial against her. He argued that “if there were a well-founded, as there has been in 
other cases in Brazil, then perfect, it takes that path, but that does not exist today and, it is 
very dishonest to present it in those terms”4. As we can see, the OAS and Uruguay are in the 
same lines regarding Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment and the UNASUR is slowly taking the 
same path. When positioning itself as supporting the Brazilian President, Uruguay took the 
advantage of its position of president of the UNASUR to launch a whole regional support. Of 
course, it cannot force any country to express an opinion they do not agree with. Yet, it can 
initiate the debate and tries to convince countries to join the statement President Vázquez 
wrote. We can see that in that particular case, Uruguay’s opinion is crucial in determining and 
influencing the whole region’s opinion. “I wish the President pro tempore of the UNASUR, 
the President of Uruguay Tabaré Vázquez would gather us quickly to Brazil to express our 
solidarity and to avoid any congressional or judicial coup, it is the great desire we have”5, 
declared the Bolivian President, Evo Morales. As we can see in those words, the decision 
Tabaré Vázquez takes as the President of the UNASUR will influence at the end, the opinion 
of the whole region.  
Finally, Uruguay became a crucial actor of the international scene, given that it has been 
elected as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the two years period 2016-
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2017. Uruguay already held once this position in 1965-1966. The UN General Assembly 
approved its election by 185 votes out of 193, what exceeds the two-thirds required. The 
Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs said "it is a great recognition of the country" and 
announced that Elbio Rosselli, Ambassador of Uruguay in Canada, will be their 
representative
1
. Rodolfo Nin Novoa also highlighted that, for a country of the size of 
Uruguay, the participation to the activities of the Security Council are important because “it 
implies a strengthening of international insertion model of the country”2. The factors 
explaining the election of Uruguay at this position are diverse. First, one can see the 
proportionally strong participation of Uruguay in UN Peacekeeping missions, mainly in Haiti 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as a significant factor justifying its election to the UN 
Security Council. In fact, “when adjusted for population, no country contributes more troops 
than Uruguay”3 and the Secretary General of the UN even thanked Uruguay for its large 
contribution to UN peacekeeping. For Ban Ki-moon, Uruguay provides what he called a 
“special brand of Uruguayan leadership and global example”4. As Fernández Huidobro, the 
Uruguayan Minister of Defense, expressed, Uruguay's experience in peace missions is "an 
important introductory letter to the Security Council”5. Second, the election has been possible 
thanks to the unanimous support of the Latin American and Caribbean bloc. In February 
2015, Luis Almagro, Minister of Foreign Affairs of that time, declared that “the endorsement 
of the Uruguayan candidacy has been achieved. It means that all countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean chose Uruguay to represent them in the Security Council”6. Third, 
Uruguay re-demonstrated recently, through among others the three polemical laws, its 
commitment at a national and international level in the promotion, protection and defense of 
human rights and international humanitarian law. For instance, Uruguay has been able to 
organize the First Regional Conference on Population and Development where the important 
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Montevideo Consensus has been adopted, making concrete the follow up of the Programme of 
Action of the 1994 ICPD.  
The active and strong presence of Uruguay in the OAS, the UNASUR, the MERCOSUR and, 
the UN Security Council demonstrates how Uruguay managed to increase its importance and 
its role in Latin America. We have seen that Uruguay is a regional norm entrepreneur: it 
managed to further develop debates and to offer alternative answers to critical situations the 
region is facing. Countries were looking closely to Uruguay’s action and vision on those 
polemical matters. It increased Uruguay’s visibility and legitimacy. The state actually showed 
that it is trustworthy and capable to deal with risky situation. The rest of the countries 
understood it and as a consequence, recognized in Uruguay the capacity for leading the main 
regional organizations. As a result, even if Uruguay is a Small State with limited resources, it 
managed to overcome its physical boundaries. Through a successful norm advocacy approach, 
Uruguay’s role in the region is far bigger than what it could have pretended. 
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V. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Uruguay, Small State of the Latin American region, recently passed three polemical laws 
which legalized abortion on demand, the same-sex marriage and the production, sale and 
consumption of cannabis. Those progressive moves of a little country, located in a rather 
conservative region, attracted interests from all over the world. But how have been perceived 
these moves by the rest of the regional countries? The question is particularly pertinent in the 
current context of the “left turn” taken by the region. Regional dynamics are under changes 
and therefore, it is relevant to wonder how Uruguay coped with these new movements. 
Besides, the case of Uruguay is particularly interesting in the sense that, despite its small size, 
many recent newspapers have dedicated their headline to the country’s laws and to the 
atypical personality of the former President José Mujica.   
This whole context guided us in the construction of our research question: “to which extent 
Uruguay can be considered as a norm entrepreneur in Latin America?”. Indeed, observing that 
Uruguay fits the criteria of a Small State for its region and that it passed recently polemical 
laws reflecting its values and norms, we have decided to put those laws in perspective with 
the theory on the normative power of Small States. We aimed to see whether the defense of 
norms helped Uruguay to strengthen its regional influence. To answer this question, we used 
textual analysis in order to evaluate how the three pioneering laws of Uruguay on abortion, 
same-sex marriage and cannabis have influenced the Latin American discourse. Our primary 
sources range from academic accounts, local newspapers, to documents of state and non-state 
organizations. 
Moreover, it appears that our research is pertinent for the academic world since it fills gaps of 
the literature. Indeed, reviewing the existing literature, we observed that Small States study 
lacks a focus on ideas and norms, what form the new point of interest of the current general 
IR theory. Regarding the premise of norm advocacy strategy, it has been mainly applied to 
case studies within the EU and has not been tested enough to be considered as a solid concept. 
And finally, much attention has been dedicated to the MERCOSUR, the UNASUR and the 
CELAC and the position of Uruguay within the organizations. However, the recent pioneering 
laws adopted in Uruguay have not been much studied up to now, even if many newspapers 
have spoken about them. We thus fill this gap by observing the impact of them on Uruguay’s 
regional image and role. 
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We found several arguments explaining why Uruguay has been able to take those polemical 
laws. Part of the explanation is found in the liberal and secular past of Uruguay. The country 
has already developed a period of pioneering liberal stance on social issues at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, under the presidency of José Batlle y Ordoñez. At the same time, 
Uruguay became a secular state, significant feature explaining the current progressive vision 
of the country. Through its history, Uruguay also demonstrated its commitment in the respect 
of human rights. Since we have found that part of the objective of all the three laws was to 
further implement human rights, a pillar of the Uruguayan society, this commitment of 
Uruguay also explains why the country has been able to pass those laws. Furthermore, three 
current factors explain why Uruguay has been able to pass those laws nowadays and not 
before. First, the country enjoys from a good conjuncture: the democracy is rather stable, the 
economy is growing reasonably, and inequality among citizens is decreasing progressively. 
This situation allows the country to focus more on the enhancing of human rights. Second, the 
Frente Amplio is the first ruling party to benefit from a parliamentary majority. The 
government took advantage of this strong position to pass polemical laws. Finally, those 
social vanguard laws helped each other by creating reciprocal solidarity. 
Let us summarize what were our main conclusions regarding the impact of the three laws in 
the following three paragraphs. First, we observed that in the case of the VIP, the Uruguayan 
law influenced slightly directly countries of the region. Only politicians of Paraguay and 
Argentina directly referred to the Uruguayan law in their unsuccessful attempts to open the 
debate on reproductive rights. However, compared to the law, the influence of the Uruguayan 
model “Changing relationships in the health care context: the Uruguayan model for reducing 
the risk and harm of unsafe abortions” was much stronger. Recognized by the PAHO as 
appropriate to replicate by countries of the region, the Uruguayan model gained much 
attention from regional organizations and, indirectly, from the countries of the region. Indeed, 
the Uruguay’s vision on abortion impacted countries indirectly through the actions of 
Uruguay in main regional organizations such the OAS. The organization of the First Regional 
Conference on Population and Development in Montevideo in 2013 promoting the 
development of safer abortion clearly illustrates Uruguay’s leadership in regulation of the 
VIP. Uruguay’s expertise in developing strategies to diminish risky abortions has been 
regionally recognized and this gave Uruguay legitimacy in leading changes in the abortion 
paradigm, moving slowly away from the prohibitive Catholic Church moral towards a more 
liberalist and feminist tolerant discourse, the main objective being to enhance human rights. 
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Second, the gay revolution is clearly happening in Latin America and we found that Uruguay 
along with Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and to some extent, Chile and Mexico, are walking 
ahead. We suggested that Uruguay is at the vanguard of this revolution given that, it was the 
first country of the region to grant the LGBT community rights such as, the legal recognition 
of homosexual unions or adoption. Regarding same-sex marriage in particular, Uruguay is 
actually sharing the leadership with Brazil and Argentina, the latter generally considered as 
the most influential experience. Nevertheless, those countries have been working together in 
the promotion of a more tolerant society towards the LGBT community, moving away from 
the Catholic Church moral. Indeed, we have seen that the main argument supporting same-sex 
marriage is the removal of discrimination that lies into the exclusive legal recognition of 
heterosexual unions. Uruguay, with likeminded states, actively favored the opening of the 
debate on homosexual unions in Latin America. An event illustrating this result is, for 
instance, the support of Uruguay, Argentina, Colombia and United States to the resolution 
brought by Brazil at a meeting of the OAS in 2008 whose objective was to condemn all forms 
of SOGI discrimination.  
Finally, among the three topics studied, the Uruguayan law on cannabis appeared to have 
been the most influential case. The US-influenced IDCR is under strong critics nowadays, 
accused mainly by Latin America to have failed and even, to have caused more damages than 
goods. The whole region of Latin America is united behind the conviction that states’ 
approach to drug issues up to now has been inefficient and sometimes, worsened the problem. 
Therefore, Latin America, the region who suffers the most from drug problems, welcomed the 
Uruguayan initiative as an experiment of a less prohibitive paradigm. Latin America, Uruguay 
at its head, wishes to put human rights and health issues at the center of the drug policy debate 
and calls for alternative paths to the actual IDCR. Even if legalization is not always 
considered as the solution for drug problems, states recognized Uruguay as the first country to 
implement an alternative model that challenges the actual IDCR. For that reason, Uruguay 
gained legitimacy in the eyes of the other regional countries and is trusted for representing 
and supporting the regional vision. The UNGASS 2016 demonstrated that a less prohibitive 
norm in the drug regulation debate has reached a tipping point but that countries such as, 
Russia, China, and Asian Muslim countries, still show high resistance to move away from the 
prohibitive paradigm. 
In the three situations, some countries have not adopted the same vision as Uruguay because 
they preferred the wait-and-see approach. As explained before, laws are still too recent to be 
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able to evaluate their pros and cons and countries may prefer to wait a little bit longer before 
jumping into the adoption of those progressive stances. Another explanation is that Uruguay 
is a perfect social laboratory, turning the country into an inspiration, more than a model to 
copy, for more complex countries. Situations in Latin America are highly diversified and what 
is appropriate for a country, and in particular for a specific country such as Uruguay, may not 
be a solution for a less homogenous or less secular country. However, consequently to those 
three laws, we have concluded that Uruguay became a norm entrepreneur in Latin America. 
Indeed, the Small State managed to launch and to orient significantly debates on crucial social 
matters. Through the strategies of framing and agenda-setting, Uruguay proposed alternative 
solutions centered on human rights, its national ideology, to face problematic situations. It 
used the support of regional organizations.  
The status of norm entrepreneur gives Uruguay legitimacy. Countries of the region recognized 
Uruguay as trustworthy and we observed that consequently, Uruguay’s role in the region 
significantly increased. Luis Almagro, former Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, has 
been elected as the Secretary General of the OAS. Countries of the region agreed that the 
Uruguayan spirit, incarnated by Luis Almagro and the colleagues he chose, should lead the 
only organization gathering all the Americas. Uruguay has also been elected to be the non-
permanent member of UN Security Council representing Latin America for the years 2016-
2017. Finally, even if those positions do no result from an election, Uruguay was the pro-
tempore president of the UNASUR during 2015 and of the MERCOSUR during the first 
semester of 2016. All those crucial positions gave Uruguay even more space to spread and 
establish its vision, as we could notice in the case of the process of impeachment against the 
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. Consequently to this status of norm entrepreneur, the 
regional role of Uruguay actually increased. This is particularly important in the current 
context of changes of regional dynamics.  
Through this research, we managed to fill the gaps observed in the literature. We have further 
developed the focus on norms within the Small States study, we have tested the solidity of the 
norm advocacy strategy for Small States, and we have completed the regional image of 
Uruguay by studying the impact of three recent laws, weakly studied up to now. We have 
observed that the case of Uruguay perfectly fits and reinforces the concept of norm advocacy 
strategy. Thanks to our research, this concept gained solidity and this opens new possibilities 
for future researches on Small States in other regions of the world.  
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VI. ABBREVIATIONS  
ALADI: Latin American Integration Association 
ALBA: Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America 
CELAC: Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
CSPMD: South American Council on the World Drug Problem 
ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
EU: European Union 
FTA: Free Trade Agreement 
FTAA: Free Trade Area of the Americas 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
ICPD: International Conference on Population and Development 
IDCR: International Drug Control Regime 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
INCB: International Narcotics Control Board 
IR theory: International Relations Theory 
IRCCA: Institute of Regulation and Control of Cannabis 
LGBT: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender 
MERCOSUR: Southern Common Market 
OAS: Organization of American States 
PAHO: Pan American Health Organization 
SEDRONAR: Secretary of the Programme for the Prevention of Drug Addiction and Fight 
against Drug Trafficking 
SOGI: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
UN: United Nations 
UNASUR: Union of South American Nations 
UNGASS: UN General Assembly Special Session  
UPR: Universal Periodic Review 
VIP: Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy 
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VIII.A. ANNEX 1. LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN’S LAW ON ABORTION 





Abortion is allowed: 
 To save the woman’s life or prohibited altogether 
 To preserve health 
 Without restriction as to reason 
  
                                                 
1
 Center for Reproductive Rights, “The World’s Abortion Laws 2014.” 
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VIII.B. ANNEX 2. LGBT RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN 




To evaluate the level of LGBT rights, eight different rights are taken into account: sexual 
activity, relationships, marriage, adoption, military, anti-discrimination, gender identity, hate 
crime. A country legally protecting the LGBT community in the eights aspects gets the scores 
of eight, zero in the contrary. The more rights a country grants to the LGBT community, the 
darker it will be. 
                                                 
1
 Corrales, “LGBT Rights and Representation in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Influence of Structure, 
Movements, Institutions, and Culture,” 15. 
